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ial Se sian of the lature on the Lama 
Prieta was just the twelve bills 
yeste in San Francisco. what we need to learn from that. 
Out of the rubble that was the Nimitz has come the reminder that 
our freeways can become s in a ea one people lost 
their lives in that col had died on 
California as a result of ac That was an elevated 
that was built under s ismic standards that were established nearly 50 
years ago, standards that were 
interchanges and overpasse California. While the number of 
fatalities is small what have been, we can't minimize their 
s 
One of the casualties of the Nimitz is ic confidence in the 
as safe as we've come to them to be, In fact, much of the confusion and 
contradiction in statements made officials immediately after 
the earthquake has added to the loss of credibility. 
Efforts to s our older tructures built under archaic seismic 
safety standards with retrofit programs began after the 1971 Sylmar quake and the 
1987 Whittier Narrows quake. But these efforts have lagged, creating additional 
questions. Have resource and money been made available to retrofit 
freeway and highway structures? How are the ies established for the 
retrofit program? Which structures in Los les may not be safe, if any, in a 
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major earthquake? Perhaps most important is determining now what needs to be 
done to prevent other deadly and destructive collapses of state and local highway 
structures, and how to provide money and manpower necessary to ensure to the 
maximum extent possible the seismic safety of our entire system. 
During the Special Session of the Legislature that convened on Thursday and 
ended Saturday night, I introduced legislation, working with my colleagues around 
the table and Caltrans, that would earmark $80 million in earthquake emergency 
spending to match against federal money to result in a $320 million statewide 
seismic safety retrofit program for state and local bridges. These funds will be 
used to assess needs and determine priority projects and then to fund the very 
highest priorities on the retrofit program. 
But it's important to add and understand that this is a down payment on 
retrofitting our streets and roads. This is $300 million on the state system; 
it's only $20 million on the local system. I think you're going to hear today of 
a much greater need, particularly on local streets and roads. It's a down 
payment, and we may have to look at SCA 1 money, if that is successful, as far as 
additional revenue in order to seismically improve and guarantee the integrity of 
our highway system. As the lessons learned in the October 17 quake are 
translated into action, much more will be needed to make our bridges as safe as 
possible and to restore confidence in our aging freeways and highways. 
That's what this is about today. The Committee wants to know what happened, 
if we can determine that; to what extent we've learned from that; what's going to 
be done different in the future; and what we're doing now to make sure that 
everything in Los Angeles and other parts of California are safe so that 
motorists, when they drive to work each morning and are sitting in 
bumper-to-bumper traffic and look up at the four-level interchange in downtown 
Los Angeles, know that it's not going to fall down on them if there's a tremor at 
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• 
that moment. Ve have tart that proce s confidence in the 
system. This is of that. 
Ve' to not find a 
or gun. What we're , I think, is understand what 
happened at the Nimitz 
in California to the be 
make sure that it never to any other structure 
all the time that when remembe 
s come, no amount mode is to be exactly correct. 
At some that is to come and all we can do is prepare as 
well as we poss can it. That' what we here for this 
Before we start with any of the members of the Committee that want to make 
any comments, I want to introduce far left which is an unusual position 
for him to be in, Mr. Cos Mr. Roos. And on my , Mr. 
Eaves, Ms. and Mr. Areias. 
There's a need to make a of ustments to. 
There are a number of that have s and are around. Bob Best 
Also, let me say 
Committee, is 
rnational Trade. That's why she's not here 
has a plane. Bob, be to 
that Ass lea who it on 
having a of her own on 
today and asked me to mention that. 
Let me first call Ed Avila is Pres of the Board of Public Works 
for the C of Los s and Bob Horii, who is the Los s Engineer. 
Then we'll go with Mr. Be t and Caltrans. 
Thank , As for accommodat my request to 
be heard First of all welcome to the Board of Public Works. It's 
somewhat unusual for me to be s on this end as to s where 
you're s 
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We truly appreciate the State's and your committee's interest in the needs 
of the City of Los Angeles and the needs of the entire State of California. 
Without question, the need is one of federal, state and local 
cooperation/collaboration to deal with what we know is a fact: earthquakes will 
occur, they have occurred, and will continue to occur in the State of California. 
The method of funding for disasters of this nature in terms of recovery is 
one which we should look at very seriously. We believe that sources of financing 
should be made permanent, that there should be the development of some source of 
funds that is literally put in some type of reserve that will be available for 
what we know will occur. It is extremely important to do that prior to the 
occurrence so that we are ready for it. Truly, what is being considered today, 
not only in the city, but in the state is, as you said, the down payment. The 
need for these funds can almost be said to be a known quantity for the 
foreseeable future in the State of California. 
On November 3, the Board of Public Works for the City of Los Angeles adopted 
a seismic strengthening of existing bridges report, which has been forwarded to 
the Mayor and the City Council. I'd like to leave that for your information. 
For the most part, it essentially shows that we'll probably have to spend 
approximately $150 million in the city, just for city structures, those which are 
under our control. The rest of the report essentially is talking about the need 
for the design capability to accomplish that task. Also, we are talking about 
another couple of million dollars for a restrainer program, essentially fixing 
bridges with restrainers that can be done without major structural change. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: The restrainer -- is that the same sort of strapping program 
that Caltrans did on the state system? 
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, the area of the 
area and the 
, we have gone through 
system, which I 
little better fine-tuned. Basically, it's based 
on the age of structure, the span of the structure, the amount of daily traffic 
carried. That's basically the criteria that we're looking at. And the type of 
construction that it is. We do have various types of construction. If you look 
at the North Broadway Bridge, which is an arch span versus the simple support 
column-supported bridge. All those factors are being put into the priority 
system, and we're looking at that right now. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: How do you prioritize between single-column versus 
multi-column? 
MR. HORII: We really don't have single-columns within the city; all ours 
are multiple columns. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: When was the last assessment done in the city for the 
priorities? When was the last time they were inspected and a look was taken? 
MR. HORII: Ye have an on-going inspection program, where we inspect the 
structures for structural stability, roadway surface, as a continuous process. I 
can't tell you which bridge was last looked at, but we do have a staff that does 
this continuously year-round, looking at the structures. I think we'll take 
another hard look at it, saying, are they really up to seismic safety? What 
you're really looking for on the structural inspection is really whether there's 
any deterioration, any cracks, or whatever, not just your superficial inspection, 
which really doesn't get into the structure itself, looking at the structural 
stability. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: How do you make the determination when you look at the 
bridges and you say they've got to be retrofitted? How do you determine that, 
even though they need to be retrofitted, they're still safe enough to keep open? 
MR. HORII: Pardon me, I didn't understand the question. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: You were mentioning that you've got 136 structures you've 
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enter is, what 
we can go is based 
CHAIRMAN KATZ What 
that the Board of Public Works 
$150 mil ion or we're not 
MR. HORII: No, we have 
have not said that. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: So you believe 
of is, and so forth. The 
have gone some major 
unde tand is 
't gone to the 
let 
're confident enough 
Council and said, we need 
these structures. 
ified the tures unsafe to drive on. We 
are safe to drive on? 
MR. HORII: I would say, in our estimation, yes, at this time, unless you 
have a major seismic event. Then we real 
time. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Mr. Roos. 
don't know what would happen at that 
ASSEMBLYMAN MIKE ROOS: Mr. Horii, what interested me in this debate that we 
just finished with in Sacramento is, when Mr. Katz was in a meeting with Ms. 
Waters, myself and others, trying to press Caltrans with respect to the insurance 
of safety on some of this double-decking, there was a standard called maximum 
credible earthquake, or an 8.3 episode. That's what we were trying to nail down. 
Is there a commonality in the engineering language with respect to what standard 
you're seeking, and would you attest that the standard for the City of Los 
Angeles is equal to the standard for the State of California and vice versa? 
MR. HORII: Ye have really not gotten to that stage of the analysis; and 
based on the testimony Caltrans has been presenting to the City Council and so 
forth, we really want to sit down with their experts and make sure our programs 
are compatible. They have a wealth of data that we did not have. And we want to 
work with them to capture that information and to examine our bridges based on 
what they're projecting. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROOS: Yell, we all know this. When we're trying to make better 
public policy, we get a group of lawyers in the room, and on the number of 
lawyers depends how many points of view and recommendations you come out with. 
Does the same exist in the engineering community? Are there legitimate 
substantial differences in the evaluation of these structures with respect to 
whether they're going to hold up under various magnitudes of a quake? 
MR. HORII: I don't think there's a difference there. It's really 
estimating what the magnitude of the quake is going to be and where the epicenter 
will be and how that energy is transmitted to that location. 
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of the Nimitz 
c inue to search 
, there's going 
to occur or not occur; 
be on the 
we afford to go to a zero 
the cost may just be too 
s than zero risk that 
the highest percentage of 
t all my structures; but if I 
went to zero risk, I could protect ten percent of the structures. So what 
is zero risk in this case? This is what makes it very difficult. 
ASSEMBLr~N ROOS: I don't think that the of Los les or the State 
of California could afford to it in those terms because it sounds 
awfully reminiscent of a Pinto report -- is the cost benefit correct in 
developing the Pinto? I don't think that you see any public lawmakers up here 
who want to run for reelection saying "Yell, it's an acceptable risk," meaning 
that this freeway may collapse on you under the worst circumstances. 
MR. HORII: I'm not saying we will not des we're going to design to 
the best knowledge that we would have regarding what we think is necessary for 
safety and so forth. We would design for that criteria and not let the dollars 
control. What I'm saying is there may be another event beyond that. Ye don't 
know. I cannot guarantee that that structure, even though I designed it for the 
7.7 or the 7.9, that may not be the actual quake that occurs. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROOS: Where are you now? Are you designing for -- what? 8.3? 
7.9? 
MR. HORII: Ye would, I think, now, go back to Caltrans and look at 
data they have -- they've done the Harbor based on the Inglewood/Newport 
Fault and take that data, and see whether that is the controlling seismic 
event on our bridges, or do we look at the San Andreas break at the 8.3 as the 
controlling point? We have not gone into that extensive at this time. We've 
done some preliminary work, based on what Caltrans has talked about, 
strengthening columns. That's where our estimates come from, just going ahead 
and beefing up the columns. Now, we may want to go back in and do additional 
work on that and say "Was our original pass at this an adequate assessment?" 
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MR. HORII: That's difficult stion answer. As Katz asked 
me, "Are the bridges safe to travel on and would shut them down today because 
of our lack of or our concern about whether would fail under a 
major seismic event? I said, "No, we 
a certain amount of comfort that we know in 
have experienced since the Beach 
not shut them down. There's 
of seismic events that we 
these s will stand up. 
We did have problems on some of the s. We've gone back and made some 
structural repairs on them. The Sixth Street has had problems. In the 
Whittier quake, we lost some street s, stuff like that, superficial damage 
on it, but not a structural damage so that we had to close the bridge for a gross 
failure. Talking about a structural failure, 'm at the gross failure, 
the bridge collapsing and not traversable to the 
In response to several of the 
questions that were asked, you 
to study the issue. We have to talk 
that we have to go back, and we have 
Caltrans we need to know what the latest 
information is. What I'd like know is how of a time frame are we talking 
about in which you will go back and you'll it and get all the information 
before actually we have an answer as to what the is and actual work can 
get started. 
MR. HORII: We'll start immediate on some 
do not have staff to do all the work so we will s 
the work. Unfortunately, we 
into this as rapidly as 
possible with the staff that I do have. a data bank there that I want to 
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how 
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answer for 
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idea which 
and systemat 
in this se. 
into those in a 
a time frame for yourself 
will be studied and 
, which went to the Board, we're 
Our process in retaining 
have them on board before the first 
time we send out requests for 
select them and negotiate 
're to the consultant 
field, we're looking at next year, the start of the next fiscal year for us, to 
have them on board. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN ROYBAL-ALLARD: So it could be potentially six or seven months 
before you'll even be able to have the consultants you need in order to get the 
information? 
MR. HORII: Yes. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN ROYBAL-ALLARD: Just to get the consultants on board will take 
about seven months. So, potentially, we could be here a year, a year and a half, 
from now and still not know what the problem is and have all the information. 
MR. HORII: Well, I'm not saying that. I'm saying that to do an entire 
program, we will need consultant help. I do have some staff that can jump on 
this thing immediately, and we can start analyzing the critical ones, starting 
today or tomorrow or whatever. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN ROYBAL-ALLARD: But it's going to be done sort of piecemeal as 
you get a little bit of information, rather than taking care of it from an 
overall plan and understanding of just what the problem is. 
MR. HORII: Yes, well, the data that you gather on what the problems are 
is going to probably apply to every one of the structures. Now, each of the 
structures may require a different type of solution. But we're gathering all the 
information how they should be analyzed, what are the forces going to be in any 
given area, geological data, the best information we can get, and then look at 
our structures, which ones are the critical ones for us to say, "Let's start a 
program to strengthen that bridge if it's necessary." 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN ROYBAL-ALLARD: But right now without the use of the 
consultants that you say you need, you're doing that without the benefit ... 
MR. HORII: Part of that work will be done with available staff, yes. 
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your We thank you very 
it 't you we 
it We're so lie support 
level, a level that will make you 
comfortable, make us comfortable, so that when we go to the people of the city, 
we can say with confidence that we're doing everything possible, everything 
within our power, to make sure this c is seismically safe. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Mr. Wyman has one question, and then I have one last 
question. Then we'll let you get on to your next meeting. 
ASSEMBLYMAN PHILLIP D. WYMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don't think it's 
unnatural for a lot of people to be peppering you folks with questions, as is the 
case with Caltrans as well. I perceive, and I think the legislation that was 
adopted, parts of some of that legislation that I and Mr. Katz were involved in, 
perceives that local government needs technical support. They need support as it 
relates to structural analysis. Caltrans has been specifically given an 
additional part of $1 million to identify the latest state-of-the-art technology 
from within the Caltrans lab, from throughout the universities, from throughout 
the world so that, if there's any additional information that we need to model 
our structures and to make them safe in the state system, that occurs. But part 
of that language in that legislation also says that that technc!ogy shall be 
shared with the City of Los Angeles, with local governments, be it county or 
city. I think that reinforced our obligation as a state to share with local 
communities so that you can get the best possible answers. I think that others 
will be discussing that. I think it's important that that commitment is stated, 
and it is stated. It was signed in legislation by the Governor yesterday, and I 
hope that will be helpful to you. 
One final point. The bench marks that you're using for the quake analysis 
is the Sylmar and the Long Beach, and what was the third? 
MR. HORII: Whittier. Now, those are not the bench marks. Those are 


















CHAIRMAN KATZ: Just one last question. I appreciate your representation in 
terms of what you're trying to give and the resources you are working with. If 
you were going to focus all of your efforts on seismic upgrades, the seismic 
safety, what would you be taking away from in order to make that happen? 
MR. AVILA: We have critical problems in this city, as every large city 
does. $150 million is a lot of money. We can't take it away from anything. 
We've got to find new resources. There is no way in the world that we can 
endanger the health and welfare of the people of the City of Los Angeles by 
stopping our sewer program or stopping our other municipal facilities programs 
that are critical to life in the city. We must find a new way of financing for 
seismic safety. The figures are enormous. There is no way to substitute. We 
shouldn't. Granted, this is extremely important, and no one is going to argue 
that, but we must find a way to deal with a problem that will recur. We will 
have earthquakes through our lifetime and for generations to come. It seems to 
me this is an ideal opportunity for all of us to get together and find a way to 
provide some kind of reserve fund that is exclusively set aside for seismic 
events, since we know that we can predict that they will occur. It seems to me 
that we, and the people of the State of California, would be willing to provide 
some source of funding. But I would be irresponsible to say I'm going to 
redirect $150-200 million from other programs in the city. It just would not be 
feasible. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Thank you very much. Bob, thank you also. Next, we're 
going to hear from Bob Best, Director of Caltrans. 
I also want to mention, members, Assemblywoman La Follette left a statement 
with the Committee. She's chairing a Los Angeles Task Force on Better Education 










Ye do know that we have a lot to learn from that event. I think the history 
of seismic safety, as Mr. Horii indicated has been one where every event teaches 
us something. Ye tend mark s and progress from certain seismic events. 
Certainly this state has undergone a dramatic change in past years in its 
approach to roadway structures as a result of earlier earthquakes, and certainly 
what we have learned from those has proven not to be enough in terms of what we 
saw that occurred up in the Bay Area. Ye're going to have to learn from that 
event and move forward. 
Ye know very well that the modern engineering tools that we have at our 
disposal today can provide us with techniques to construct structures that can 
resist virtually any type of force that can be expected. As Mr. Horii indicated, 
one of the big lems we're fac is how to predict, with regard to an 
earthquake, what in fact does occur or will occur in order to try to go through 
and construct the appropriate des for that. 
So as we step off in this program, we're going to be looking at the 
prioritization that we have in programs where we had developed, on 
a statewide basis, a retrofit program. Ye have to look at that retrofit program 
and decide whether or not what way it should be modified. We now, under the 
legislation that was s by the Governor, passed last week by the Legislature, 
are going to include that local bridges and have to develop again a new 
prioritization based upon what we learned and based upon the involvement now of 
any local 
system. 
s in this program, 11 as br s on the state 
The Committee did present to us a number of questions in advance, and we 
have provided a written response to those questions. Mr. Roberts can go into 
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devices to simulate some of the movements and forces, to measure that and 
measure its response to see what can be learned. We have to do that kind of 
research. We have to do univers research to divine how that program can 
go forward. In addition, once we have that , the individual structures 
are jus that. They're individual. And then you have to move from that 
knowledge into the field of des the exact retrofit that's to be 
placed on each So we have a very, very program ahead of us. 
When we say crash program, that means we're to be pouring resources 
into it and moving on a much more basis than the retrofit program was 
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set up in the past. It also means that part of that crash program is going to be 
an expedited investment in research to determine the knowledge we need in order 
to begin to design the appropriate programs, 
We're going to learn a lot from this quake in Northern California, and we're 
going to see a lot of changes introduced into the way we approach seismic safety 
in the state as a result of that. In looking at the bridges that are in place, 
we have conducted a review of the bridges down here to determine, based upon what 
we could learn immediately from that quake in Northern California and the effects 
that were received, do we have any bridges that we would be concerned about the 
safety for the traveling public here in Southern California? Our first review of 
that has indicated, no. In looking at that, we have no structures down here in 
Southern California that are designed similar to the ones that collapsed in 
Northern California. That's one of the key factors, of course, in terms of 
trying to determine what degree of confidence in safety we can have of the 
structures that are down here. 
One major structure that is under construction on the 110 -- we have called 
in a peer review committee to take a look at the design for that, bringing people 
in from the private sector and universities to work with an internal review team. 
We will not start construction of that particular structure until that peer 
review has been completed and has indicated that either the designs are safe, 
from everything we know; or if they have indicated certain changes, we've been 
able to incorporate the necessary changes in that. So those are the kinds of 
immediate reactions that are going on at the current time while we still have to 
go ahead and learn some more from what the experience has been in Northern 
California. 
Would you like to move immediately to Mr. Roberts, Mr. Chairman, or do you 
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Last Friday, I introduced a comprehensive multi-million dollar measure 
before the City Council to ensure that Los Angeles City structures, the housing 
projects, the bridges, the overpasses, and residential brick buildings meet 
earthquake standards. A piecemeal approach to bringing our city up to earthquake 
safety standards doesn't make sense. That's why we have to take a comprehensive 
approach. 
You listened to some of the testimony by Mr. Horii. He talked about some of 
the bridges that we have here in Los Angeles that do not meet seismic standards. 
Whether we talk about public buildings -- and we have about 128 of them here in 
Los Angeles that are unsafe out of the 187 city-owned buildings. As far as 
residential brick buildings, we have more than 23,000 residential units that 
remain out of compliance. The housing projects -- from information that we have 
received, all of their structures meet city codes. But much work remains to be 
done as far as doing some of the work as it relates to the strapping of water 
heaters and other non-critical issues. The bridges you heard that we have 416 
city-owned bridges and overpasses, and over 100 bridges need some level of 
reinforcement. 
Along with the measure, we have included homeless shelters, of which we have 
about 150 shelters in the City of Los Angeles that house approximately 6,000 
people every night. I am proposing that $10 million be set aside from the bond 
proceeds for the expansion and rehabilitation of these shelters that would 
increase our capacity by 5,000 people that could be served on top of those that 
we serve today. 
It seems to me that a lot of work has to be done in the coming weeks and 
months so that the situation that we saw happen in San Francisco does not 
reappear here in Los Angeles. It seems to me that being proactive, as opposed to 










as to how 
much money would be needed to bring some of the overpasses, bridges, public 
buildings up to code, we could put the general obligation bond measure back on 
the ballot with an 
I think we have that capac 
to support it and to see that it is passed. 
here in the city. I think that whatever money we 
invest today is going to be a small token of what we would have to invest if an 
earthquake hits in the very same manner that San Francisco was. I would hope 
that we could learn something from that, so that the City of Los Angeles could 
move in a proactive manner. 
ASSEMBLYMAN AREIAS: Richard, what kind of match, assuming that there is 
some kind of match, do you think the City would be willing to do as it relates to 
the State? 
COUNCILMAN ALATORRE: About one for one wouldn't be bad. I don't know if 
that's even possible. The State has tremendous obligations, I'm sure, just to 
take care of their own public buildings, as well as the roads, the freeways, and 
the like, and the bridges that are state-owned. I think, the State has some 
problems. Yes, we would like to see some relief. Whether that's realistic 
remains to be seen. But in the meantime, it seems to me that we have an 
obligation to move in a proactive manner, so that we can at least stabilize and 
deal with whatever it is the City has responsibilities over, that we can minimize 
the possibility of human loss. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Mike. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROOS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just wanted to note to the 
Chairman and Mr. Areias how City Hall has obviously mellowed Mr. Alatorre. I 
remember the day when he would think an equitable formula would be two for one, 
two state dollars for every one local. 
COUNCILMAN ALATORRE: Well, I was really going to talk about five for one. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROOS: That's the Alatorre I'm used to working with. 
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can't say just two lives, in 
been two lives lost. And even though we 
to the fact that lives are lost every day 
on the road system around the state, there was not a feeling that there was such 
a threat to the structures in the state that it had to be carried off as a very 
expeditious program. We have now learned that there is a higher degree of threat 
from the structures of the state than was expected at the time that program was 
designed, but we don't know exactly yet the degree of that threat because we 
aren't through with our learning. In retro also, we have to say that, with 
regard to the identification of the st priority risk, in setting up a 
program to take care of that risk, it was indeed an accurate judgment. 
We completed Phase 1 during the time that Phase 1 was under work; no 
structures failed from that. During the or we had up there, no 
structure failed from the phase because of the inadequacy of the Phase 1 retrofit 
program; and at the time the program was des , nobody believed that there 
would be the type of 
earthquake than was 
its priority. Ce 
readdress that whole 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: 
column failure, even from a much larger 
So the program moved within government, given 
I think we're all in now that we need to 
of the s for this program. 
terms of the Phase 2, you indicated there's a contract 
with UCSD. Also, there's an additional contract with UC Berkeley on multi-column 
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term 
to do that versus 
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But 
ime, there were a lot of needs on 
the state system that were clear and evident and immediately apparent 
that were competing for the same dollars that the seismic program was. 
To the best of my knowle , there was no specific proposal put together 
for additional resources for the seismic safety program that was denied in 
the process. But within a large institution, the institution itself goes through 
a process of balancing what it's going to ask for, and the seismic program was 
developed within the institution to be a long-range program and to be done on a 
sequential phase basis rather than to be a short-range program with the phases 
running parallel. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: I have one last question. To your knowledge, are there any 
single-column structures in the Los Angeles area built pre-1971? 
MR. BEST: I have to refer to Jim on that. I assume there probably are. 
He's nodding his head. Why don't we let him give you more details on that. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Okay, I'll come back to Jim on that. Mr. Roos, then Mr. 
Eaves, and then Mr. Areias. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROOS: Mr. Best, I wanted to get back to the questions I was 
asking Mr. Horii in terms of the degree of certainty about your internal 
evaluations and would they match up with an independent audit or an independent 
analysis? Would you attest that there would probably be no variance in what your 
people conclude versus what an independent engineering firm would conclude? 
MR. BEST: I think the answer to your question is, yes, from what I know of 
the field. I've learned a lot about it in the last couple of weeks, being a 
lawyer and not an engineer. But when you get to the experts in the field, there 
isn't a lot of what I would call independence in the sense that most of these 
people have been working with each other for many, many years now, and that 
includes on an international basis. Any time there's been a major seismic event, 













inc There is 
definitely going to be some degree of competition for resources. At this stage, 
we haven't really sorted that out, and there is a lot of concern that we not 
abandon on-going projects for totally pursuing this particular process. It is 
our understanding right now that, if we can assume for a moment that the 
independent resources are going to be there, in other words, that the policy 
decisions with regard to resource allocation do not result in transferring 
resources from other projects to this program, we will be able to keep both of 
them on schedule providing, in addition to our own in-house expertise, there are 
substantial contributions from the private engineering sector specifically on 
this effort. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROOS: One final question. Have you made a determination what's 
going to happen to the Embarcadero Freeway yet? 
MR. BEST: No, we have not made that determination. The Embarcadero Freeway 
actually suffered from ... 
(Due to loss of power to the recorder, the recording was interrupted at this 
point in the hearing, resulting in the loss of a short period of testimony.) 
... There were some initial standards going out. This review will be a very 
high priority item. We have a lot of people on board looking at this from 
various points of view, collecting information, taking samples, beginning to run 
analyses. As I said earlier, we intend to rig a portion that's going to be left 
standing for the purpose of dynamic testing of the structure in place. We're 
talking about a matter of weeks of concentrated effort and then, of course, some 
time to actually look at what that means. We're not talking years here; we're 
talking months in terms of being able to come up with a large percentage of the 
knowledge. Actually, I think, and I'm sure Jim would agree with this, in terms 
-34-
• 
of the ultimate 
studying and 
But that's the proce 
first effort. 




years that '11 be 
and the ultimate 
what learn in the 
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group that studied the Harbor trans What kind of time frame? You 
said no construction is 
kind of time frame are you 
until that peer review 
with that peer review? 
completed. What 
MR. BEST: Do you have a date on that, Jim? know 're 
underway. Ye expect to have it done 
construction can start. 
the end of the year. Then the 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Mr. Costa. 
Yes, back to the 
when we concluded our work, we passed a number of 
question. Last weekend 
s of lation that 
dealt with both the acceleration of the seismic asse sment and retrofit program. 
Ye also for sales tax for additional means match the 
federal funds. The cost that this is 
all the retrofit, do you have any handle 
than we have provided for thus far. 
to reate in terms of dealing with 
it seems to me it's going to be more 
MR. BEST: Again, of course, the program that we're looking at now is not 
only a state program, but also includes local structures as well. You heard this 
morning a kind of eye-ball guestimate for Los Angeles of $150 million. We're 
looking at what we believe to be a minimum of a 00 million program at the state 
level and probably higher than that to do the top bridges. But, in 
terms of actually giving a figure on this kind of a program to you any sort 
of a hard figure -- until you have completed your design and have a few 
bids in, it's very hard to give actual dollar amounts. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: And I don' expect you to give me a hard figure, but I 
think it's safe to say, at least from my pe , that it's going to be larger 
than the amount that we've 
considerations is the 
you thus far. My que tion then, what 
funds to do the job so that we can have 
system? 
at now in terms of ing additional 
safety in our transportation 
MR. BEST: Ve're at the federal level. A lot in terms of the amount 
of dollars we will need here at the state and local level depends upon the degree 
of federal partie ion, part whether or not the federal government will 
agree to include the program as part of the emergency relief program that they 
have approved, like we have included it as of our emergency program at the 
state level. There's a unce there as to where the federal government 
will come down in terms of helping to support this particular program. Beyond 
that, if we have to come up with funding totally at the state level -- let me 
clarify that. It's clear that most of the work on the state highway system and 
certainly a portion of the work on the local government system will be federally 
eligible. So the question is whether it is eligible under the special disaster 
relief program or whether you have to include it in your on-going program and, 
therefore, would offset other ects that might qualify for the regular 
on-going program. That's the big question now. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Now you're getting to a concern that I have. Ve're 
obvious here to deal with the rehabilitation and the retrofit, the safety 
questions at hand. The Chairman mentioned in his opening comment -- correct me 
if I'm wrong-- that potentially the transportation package that we're going to 
be asking the voters to approve next year might be a source of some additional 
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have and many of us on the 
we're the voters to approve next year not 
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in itself, 
It seems to me that if some 
safety reasons, we need to 
additional incentive for the passage 
s determined to be set aside for 
word out because that would 
that act in June, Would the 
3 
Administration be prepared to make a recommendation, Mr. Best, to the 
Legislature in to whether or not, if sufficient funding is not 
available from other sources, any money should be diverted from the 
transportation package? 
MR. BEST: Ye would be in a position to make a policy recommendation, but I 
don't think by we'll really have the numbers tied down very hard. But 
we certainly will have better numbers than we're working with today. Let me 
emphasize that the transportation program that was going to be supported from the 
SCA 1 measure was a ten-year program; and built into that program, at least on 
the state highway system, was the continuation of the retrofit program that was 
underway. So some of the retrofitting dollars were envisioned to be part of that 
program and were included within that program. Now, from my understanding of the 
discussions, I don't believe there was any determination made with regard to the 
local share of that funding package, that any of that would be directed one way 
or another. But in terms of the basic ideas for the state program, at the time 
that package was put together, it was expected that Phase 2 would be included 
within that package and certainly at least the beginnings of Phase 3 as well. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Yill you be prepared in January to let this committee 
know in what areas there was planned to be retrofitting and in fact that this 
would dovetail? 
MR. BEST: Ye will give the Committee a in January, or whatever 
meeting you wish to schedule that for, Mr. Chairman, as to how we foresee the 
retrofit program fitting in with the SCA 1 program. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: That would be very helpful. One last question. In the 
conclusion of the Chairman's s~atement, they talk about giving assessment to 
retrofit needs that include not local road, but rail transit as well. And 
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, as a 
tive in 
a serious 
location and the 
losed 
isco. 
incorrect in that 
hold up as we as -- at least 
the one, Cypress, didn't hold up as we had anticipated. However, the 506 in San 
Francisco did , but frankly that damage was isolated to just a 
few constructions that were a mile We feel very strongly today that 
this prioritization of the hinges first was the way to go, and we would 
recommend that today to the local agencies in their first review. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: I don't think anybody is questioning the strapping program 
as having been worthwhile. I think some of us may wonder why it took 16 years to 
do it. The concern is that two years ago you were warning about potential for 
single-column failure in pre-1971 structures. There are a lot of pre-1971 
single-column structures throughout the Los Angeles basin that all of us drive, 
and I'm not getting a whole lot of reassurance that I want to drive home this 
afternoon as opposed to walk. 
MR. ROBERTS I think that, quite frankly, we've had to struggle within the 
Department for this program versus other traffic safety programs. I've been 
accused the press of not pushing the program fast enough -- why I waited until 
1987 to write those letters -- at the same time, accused of possibly over-stating 
the case to get the million program. That program was, in fact, approved 
after I wrote the letter. The California Transportation Commission voted to put 
the funds into the program in December. 
I wrote a letter on January 4, directing my people to get moving on the 
des and the 
with UC San 
It did take a year to get that done. We've been working 
on the research for single-column retrofits. Most of those 
test haven't been We did pursue designs for the projects 
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versus funding for blood alley on Highway 120 in the San Joaquin Valley? How do 
I make those determinations now? 
MR. ROBERTS: I think I understand your pas sir, but seismic people 
agree certainly over and over that, although we wrote this, they don't see the 
structures today that they feel, from their analysis, are unsafe or should be 
closed, that we haven't closed. Yhat we want to do is get the Phase 2 program 
completed so that we won't have the kind of damage that requires shoring them and 
closing the road either above or below. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: I guess then, just to bring it full circle on the Phase 2, 
when you wrote the memo in October 1987, you said that you could advertise 
contracts on July 1, 1988. You didn't seem to think you needed more research at 
that point. You didn't seem to think there were any problems. 
MR. ROBERTS: The contract with the University of California at San Diego 
was well underway. They had done their theoretical work. Towards the summer of 
1988, they had begun building models, half-scale models for their testing, and 
that testing is still going on. There's a series of about six models. Tests 
have been completed on three. I wrote a memo to my people to get the plans and 
the details developed based on the research. They did that. The analysis is not 
that simple because you're doing an analysis of a structure based on what it's 
good for in the old codes and then adding to that what you can get from the 
reinforcement. Then the details to make it work have to be developed. We got 
about eight projects completed in the fiscal year. They're in line to be 
advertised. As you know, the first two were approved by the California 
Transportation Commission. They are here in the Los Angeles area. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: You wrote the memo in October. It went to the agency in 
October: agency signed off on it in October-November, I guess. Then you came 
back again at the end of November with the cost-benefit considerations for Phase 
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MR. ROBERTS: You asked a question earlie about the number of people that 
are involved in this program. I have seven ass full-time and then a 
number of designers that work on it. 's from a group of 1,000 that 
are involved in des , construction and maintenance. So I think that puts the 
program into conflict. Also, the for the first -- even up until this 
earthquake, the first 80 years on the system, there were two fatalities. Yes, 
sir, we had to hard to get the program 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Seven folks work in seismic out of 1,000 doing 
design, the maj 
new projects? 
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MR. ROBERTS: And many p ects, as Mr. Best mentioned have some 
safety features. But I think this is the only one where we have people 
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specifically assigned for what's definitely a safety part of the program. In 
addition to the people we have, we've spent, since the San Fernando earthquake, 
$2,600,000 at six different universities on various types of seismic research. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Any other questions? Thank you, Mr. Roberts. Let me get 
Mr. Leonard up here since he has to get out of here. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN DELAINE EASTIN: Could I ask Mr. Roberts one quick question? 
Sorry I came late. I wanted to know about your memo that you wrote and then you 
said you exaggerated it, and now you're in the funny position of ... 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Delaine, we just went through this whole thing on this memo. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN EASTIN: Was it an exaggeration or not? 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Mr. Roberts said that he wrote the memo as an attempt to 
draw attention and get funding. We just went through that whole thing. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN EASTIN: The only point I'm trying to get at, Mr. Chair, is 
what is the ethic in the Department that causes someone to feel in his own 
testimony to the press that he's exaggerated a problem after the fact. I need to 
know whether you exaggerated the problem or didn't exaggerate the problem. If 
you felt you had to exaggerate the problem, that's a problem. But if, in fact, 
people had pressured you subsequent to that to say it was an exaggeration, then I 
think that's a different problem. Which is it? 
MR. ROBERTS: I think I need to repeat my statement that it's really not 
possible to guarantee that there won't be fatalities at any time. We sit here 
and say what we know today about the bridges in this state; if they're unsafe, 
they're closed. As a result of the last earthquake, we closed all of the 
double-deck viaducts in San Francisco. But in this same earthquake, bridges that 
were designed previous to 1972 and post-1972 performed well in the area of this 
earthquake. What we're trying to do on this program is reduce damage so that we 
don't have to close up. The system's not functioning in San Francisco on three 
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MR. ROBERTS: The state -- we've estimated 500 million. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN EASTIN: You would say 00-500 million: but sometimes your 
estimates tend to be a little bit on the lean side, isn't that true? 
MR. ROBERTS 're on the lean ide in this area specifically because we 
have excellent experience on the INS program and we can ce provide a lot 
at all on Phase of good information to local agencies. Ye don' have 
2. Ye have contracts about to be awarded. some kind of bids in, we 
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ASSEMBLYYOMAN EASTIN Thank you. 
CHAifu~N KATZ: Thank you, Mr. Roberts. Mr. Leonard wants to make a brief 
statement from the Chairman of the California Transportation Commission. Then 
we'll go on with Dr. Pries from the Univers of California at San Diego. 
MR. WILLIAM LEONARD: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. name is Bill Leonard. 
I'm Vice Chairman of the California Transportation Commission. I'm pleased to 
have the opportunity to appear before the As Transportation Committee on 
behalf of our chairman, Joe Duffel, senting the CTC. Mr. Chairman, much of 
my testimony is repetitious. In the interest of the Committee's time and my 
voice, I'm not going to repeat. My remarks have been put in writing and will be 
passed out to members. Let me make a few observations though. 
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On October 17 at 5 04, our fellow Californians experienced a disaster. This 
event, which we have dreaded throughout California, brought devastation to 
one of the loveliest and most historic areas of our state, the San Francisco Bay 
area. 
In spite of the incredible destruction, there was much to give thanks for. 
The immediate reaction of Caltrans, state and local officials, and our fellow 
citizens in the Bay area, did much to mitigate the loss and suffering. It is 
well to bear in mind as we seek solutions to this terrible toll, an earthquake of 
similar magnitude in Armenia last year caused the lives of 25,000 people. The 
Nimitz Freeway and the Bay Bridge failure was a terrible tragedy. To keep this 
tragedy in perspective, we have to be grateful that it wasn't even J greater 
tragedy. And I give this as an accolade not only to Caltrans, but to make a 
point. 
Rehabilitation of the California highway and freeway system has been always 
assigned the highest for available funding. Seismic retrofit projects 
are part of the rehabilitation program. As individual projects have been readied 
by Caltrans for construction, the Commission, without exception, has allocated 
construction funds so the contracts could be awarded. In recent years of funding 
shortages, it has been necessary to curtail new capacity projects in order to 
assure that rehabilitation, including seismic retrofit, come first~ 
Let me make a personal observation, if I may. The San Franc earthquake 
of October 17 is a catastrophe that will long be remembered. No one knows 
precisely when or where the next earthquake will be centered, though we do know 
with a high degree of certitude that there will be another. One thing we do know 
is that there will be frequent and continuing catastrophes that heavily 
impact the motoring public. It may be a fire; it may be a flood. It usually is 




multi-car pile-up, or even a s -car accident. Whatever it certainly is a 
to those involved. The Commission ve sensitive these concerns. 
Most every we ect des to save 
ects, such as sound lives and protect prope 
attenuation walls or 
getting federal funds for 
when it's mandated, or it's the 
ects that meet the criteria of 
of 
people 
of assuring a and property. The Commission is committed to the necess 
safe, reliable 
adequately funded, as a 
system, that its maintenance and repair is 
over above other assessments in the system. 
One can lead to the ine conclusion that, with limited transportation 
funds, choices must be made as to which future capac we should attempt to 
negate. In that event, it becomes Hobson's choice. It essential that 
additional funding be 
severely limited State 
d to reimburse emergency expenditures from the 
Account. We not raise sufficient funds 
to repair the but shore up to avoid future 
failures and to provide congestion relief and acce rate our seismic retrofit 
program. Caltrans and the Commission are out of money to meet the transportation 
needs of the rich state and very 
Today is election day in my 
economy. 
, San Bernardino. On the ballot is a 
proposed one-half cent sales tax increase. In 
increase in sales tax I sent to each of the 
editor. Two sentences in my letter are 
of the adoption of this 
newspapers a letter to the 
germane for this committee's 
hearing today: (1) California has one of the lowest gas tax rates in the 
nation. (2) While inflation has driven the cost of ion projects 
skyward, because they bought efficient cars, the cost to the motorist has 
materially dropped. Measured in terms of today's dollars, California drivers 
paid $183 in annual gas tax in 1964 compared to the average annual tax in 1987 
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of $58. In 1964, California was rated as having the best transportation system 
in the United States. In 1989, we cannot keep up with the repair, maintenance, 
rehabilitation, plus new capacity, with 30-cent dollars. 
If I may expand just a little bit on one of the questions that was 
propounded to Director Bob Best, were you to take all of our transportation 
dollars and categorize them into one of three categories, they would become 
either (1) engineering support, planning, administration and operations, or (2) 
maintenance and rehabilitation, or (3) capital outlay. As we reported to the 
Legislature in our annual report of January 1988, maintenance and rehabilitation 
projects have increased 600%, from $489 million during 1966-70 to $3.4 billion 
expected during the 1986-90 period. Thereby, overall transportation budgets 
between 1966-70 was 9%. This has grown to 21% for the recent 1981-85 period and 
will continue to grow to 32% of expenditures between 1986-90. Despite recent 
year increases in highway capital outlay expenditures, capital outlay will have 
decreased as much as 77%, adjusted for inflation, between 1966 and 1990. The 
increasing maintenance burden, combined with little real growth and 
transportation expenditures, has left less capital outlay money to expand highway 
capacity in new areas of rapid growth and to serve real economic growth in 
California's long-established major urban areas. 
Mr. Chairman, thank you very kindly for the opportunity to appear before 
you. If there are questions, I shall attempt to answer. Bob Remen our 
executive, is with me and might be able to field them. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Thank you very much, Mr. Leonard. You touched upon a 
comment in terms of the expenditures that dealt with a question that I had asked 
Mr. Best earlier. Has the Commission met since the earthquake? 










ects upon the 
s 
be 
year by the voters. It's clear, based upon the comments Mr. Best made in 
response to my question, that the cost of the , the 
rehabilitation is to exceed what we thus far. How much of federal 
dollars we're going to receive remains to be seen. As you indicated, we don't 
have enough money as it is. In essence we almost don't have money at 
this point. What recommendations are you to be to the 
Administration and to the lature for additional espec if some 
of these monies are taken out of SCA 1 to deal with the 
today? 
questions at hand 
MR. LEONARD: Well, Mr. Chairman let me that the Commission, 
number one, is very st and active SCA 1, both individually and 
collectively. Number two, we , don't have a handle on the ; and 
from Director Best's comments he doesn' It will be some little while 
before the Department does have a handle. However we have asked them to provide 
us at the earliest possible time, poss the November meeting, a proposal for 
acceleration of the 2 retrofit programs and a proposal for the solving 
of those bridges and structures that came in 3 • 3 was a new 
category for us. Ye were not aware of that until October 18. There's going to 
be a great deal of room for the sector to attack those problems. 
Director Best made reference to that. I think a many of our solutions are 
going to come from the private sector because the job at this point is 
overwhelming. 
Where are the additional funds going to come from? This Committee was 
certainly very beneficial and instrumental in getting federal funds in large sums 
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available to California, much larger than the law would ordinarily provide had 
you not had the law changed. That's going to be very, very helpful. There's the 
extra quarter of a cent that's going to be very, very helpful. The rainy-day 
fund is going to be very, very helpful. And here I have to get into a personal 
opinion. Add them all up, they're not enough. They are just not enough. We've 
allowed our infrastructure to go downhill. I picked the year of '64 because that 
was a year we could look back on when California was proud of its infrastructure. 
We have not put enough of our resources there. Now, that opens up the question 
for the Legislature to determine whether that means that there should be a 
curtailment of existing programs, whether there should be additional revenue 
introduced in the program, or whether it should be accomplished by both. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Well, ultimately, it is both our responsibility and the 
Administration's; and since this will probably carry over to the next 
Administration, we'll hope, whoever they are, they'll be prepared to make some 
recommendations. But will the Commission, in your opinion, be also prepared to 
make recommendations as a commission. You have $18.5 billion worth of priorities 
over a ten-year basis. A lot of those projects have already tentatively been 
approved, are there awaiting those funds. Will you have to make any decisions in 
terms of prioritization if a billion dollars-plus is taken from that total sum of 
money for the purpose of retrofit for safety reasons? 
MR. LEONARD: Mr. Chairman, I'm not going to bore you with the chicken and 
the pig story. But I'm here with a fever because I want you to know that this 
commissioner is firmly committed to working with the Legislature in any way we 
can, and we will put our money where our mouth is. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: We appreciate that. 
MR. LEONARD: Thank you, sir. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: I have a question by Ms. Eastin. 
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That's correct. And , which was the 
therefore, the Nimitz 
ASSEMLYWOMAN EASTIN 
not in any 
And you also that Mr. Roberts, the bridge 
was some serious threat to structures chief at Calt , had 
life if certain other retrofit 
MR. LEONARD: I was not 
don't know the date of 




million for retrofit in California did 
MR. LEONARD: The answer is "no 
did submit to us a 1 of 
2 of million which has been 
. Eastin if I 
4 million which was 
funded but 
? 
should be -- I 
to you a 00-500 
say that they 
funded, a 
. 2 million has 
been let. And that's understandable because of the lead time necessary to 
the ects going. I would make observation just from my own seeking of 
information since the lieve million 
closer to $200-250 million. I say that in the sense 
Department, but as 




ect back I think 
ive than 
to be much 
the 
're finding 
believed it would 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN EASTIN: Have you ever seen anything at Caltrans that wasn't? 
I'm not trying to make wrong here. What I am trying to do is say that, in the 
past, I'm not sure any of us have asked the right questions. But I think it's 
incumbent on all of us to ask the right questions now. We've had a terrible 
reminder of just how far behind our infrastructure needs are. While it's been 
sexy to go after the new construction, the new capacity projects and not so 
glamorous to go after the retrofit projects, it seems to me that ought to become 
a priority in California and that we ought to move as quickly as possible to fund 
that and to do so also with a sense of urgency. Clearly, by the fact that you've 
let $1.2 million, the fact that CTC was told that they could be advertising 
contracts as early as July 1, 1988, and here it is November 1989, it seems to me 
there isn't a sense of urgency. This has not been a high-priority project and 
really needs to be moved up in terms of the sense of urgency for all of 
California. 
MR. LEONARD: Ms. Eastin, in all due respect, don't draw an erroneous 
conclusion. Looking at the chart, from '76 through '90, maintenance is pretty 
well leveled out, no change. Rehabilitation, which would include seismic 
retrofit, has actually increased for the last five-year cycle, '86-'90. The 
price of holding maintenance level and increasing rehabilitation has been by 
decreasing capital outlay almost $3 million. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN EASTIN: While I agree that we're spending a lot more money on 
rehabilitation than we historically did, I would still suggest that the Cypress 
~ 
points out, since it wasn't even on anyone's plate to do in the immediate future 
in terms of the kind of retrofit we would have needed, it seems to me that we do 
need to have a greater sense of urgency, more fire in our belly, if you will, 
about this issue, which has up to now not been a very interesting subject for a 
lot of people. 
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MR. LEONARD I can't quarre 
the Commission pos 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN 
south use 
reconstruction. Do think use 
how our resource should be 
concerned? 
MR. LEONARD: Ms. tin that' 
wrestle with. From very technical 
I would like to what's needed 





doesn't real turn me But I unde 
issue for you folks to wre tle with. 
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it 100%. I feel certain 
the historic 
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for myself, 





the normal e 
that 
That's an 
the CTC is 
that are 
It would be a 
period shame to see that 
that we see in the STIP ect. I would that the CTC would 
a policy 
such catac 
that would ensure, not jus for the ss, but for any other 
event in the future, that the total reconstruction would receive 
priority under state 
MR. LEONARD: I understand what you're and I, with no hes 
whatsoever, would that and feel very comfortable that the entire 
Commission would support that position, its chairman, Joe Duffel, 
Fortunate , he wasn't on the 
were two commissioners that were 
As a matter of fact, at the time there 
close to creating vacancies on our 
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commission because of that catastrophe. It's a very sensitive, personal subject 
with the commissioners. I can assure you it will move forward with dispatch. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN EASTIN: Thank you very much, Mr. Leonard. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Thank you, Mr. Leonard. Hearing no further questions, 
we will take the next witness. Dr. Nigel Priestly, University of California from 
San Diego. Dr. Priestly must have left. We have Dr. David Rogers with 
Rogers/Pacific, Inc. of Pleasant Hill. 
DR. J. DAVID ROGERS: Mr. Chairman, I had originally intended to show 
slides. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: That would be rather difficult, I think. Why don't you 
try to be very visual in your description. 
DR. ROGERS: Everything that I have to say is in the testimony outline. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Please sum it up, give us a briefing. 
DR. ROGERS: Basically, I worked on preparing a dynamic analysis proposal on 
the structure while I was in graduate school at the University of California at 
Berkeley. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: On which structure? 
DR. ROGERS: On the Cypress structure -- 1977 and 1978. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: This was a class project? 
DR. ROGERS: No, this was an individual research project with Professor 
Jerome M. Raphael, the reinforced concrete expert. At that time, we identified a 
number of possible modes of failure of the structure. I've summarized those in 
my notes. 
We were frustrated, at the time, with the paucity of data, especially 
structural site response spectra data from earthquakes. Basically, all we were 
using at that time was the 1940 El Centro quake and the new records that were 
developed from the Sylmar quake of 1971. We did not have the kind of data, 
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motion instrumentation data, need use for the types of 
s we in the Area. And indeed, when quake hit we see 
a great variation in the s of levels we in 
downtown Oakland, about four times what we in San Francisco, the same 
distance from That was to worry about ten years ago, and I 
think we're worrying about it now. 
Commission, espec Drs. Clarence There are members of the Seismic 
Allen and Bruce Bolt, who question us the maximum credible earthquake method. 
You start there, but it isn't 
structural response you're 
to tell you what level of and 
to have in any one icular area. That's 
going to take another generation of 
over the next ten or 
At the time I 





you can see in there a cost of 
on how many s we had to do. 
The results of one birth to the necess or the non-necessity of 
going to the next At that time we learned there was no money set aside 
for the analysis of multi-column structures, even other major 
structures at that time were being analyzed 
Bridge and the Golden Gate Bridge, 
the Department, such as the Bay 
I've also put in the notes the observations about the earthquake, what we 
knew about the earthquake. The earthquake was not unexpected. That was the most 
powerful earthquake we were to have in the Bay Area. It had five times more 
probability than any other earthquake, and the area was identified in 
reports under the direction of the Seismic Safety Commission, or at 
their request, in 1984. I've referenced that in division 2. I've also put there 
a description of the styles and modes of failure seen on the site, a number of 
scaled engineer drawings. There's 19 figures in the back of the notes, and you 
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could refer to that for further information. I'll defer from taking any more of 
your time. I'll be glad to answer any questions. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Thank you. Yhy do you think the Embarcadero Freeway, 
that is a multi-tier structure, appears to have withstood the affects of the 
quake in better condition than the Nimitz did? 
DR. ROGERS: There's two figures I would refer you to in the back, figure 1, 
figure 2. Figure 1 is from our original 1978 proposal. It shows that the 
Cypress was a very long, linear structure, probably about 6,800 feet long. It's 
very straight shot. In straight structures, you can get earthquake waves, shown 
on the bottom of the figure, reverberating up the structure; and you have a 
different kind of structural response coming back through the structure so the 
waves can synchronize. If the waves become synchronous, you can get even much 
higher levels of vertical motion pounding up and down, which was not even 
appreciated until after the San Fernando earthquake in 1971. It was not 
appreciated, period. We were very frustrated. I spent about nine months trying 
to find vertical records, because we were worried about this mode of failure. 
You can see on the second deck in on that figure 1, we've drawn a circle around 
the bottom of the upper supporting columns. That was the area we were worried 
about in vertical shaking. 
On figure 2, on the next page, you see the answer to your other question 
about the Embarcadero Freeway, the central freeway, the 280. Those structures 
are curved and they have a lot of ramp appendages. Yhen you do that, you have 
some natural defense towards having these synchronous dynamic responses, because 
the earthquake energy wave is hitting the structure at a different point on the 
structure at any one time, so the waves don't ride up with each other and get 
reflecting with each other. 
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Last , we look at 7 the most 
strong motion instrumentation results, a program that was 
one. These are 
talled in the state, 
the California 
quake. In there 
Motion trumentation after the 1971 
can see the 
horizontal accelerations. You 
respect to what level San Francisco 
are we vectors. 
see that Oakland bas 
This 
se are the maximum 
hammered with 
the fact that even 
though it's the same 
epicenter, the 
, the same 
response, the loads 
r, the same distance from 
structures, are to be 
very, very different, a five-fold difference across the same area here. So it 
depends what kind of geology you build your structure on and what the geometry of 
your structure is as to how it performs. 
ASSEMBLYVOMAN EASTIN: Dr. you were s , what would you 
say the policy for California are not us at the Cypress 
but general If you were tomorrow elected to the State lature, what would 
you do to ensure we don't ever have to talk about another failure like this. 
DR. ROGERS: Well we're to other failure It's like having 
rain records. We have one record; it shows up about every ten years . Every 
time we have one of those we learn a lot. Vhat we've learned in Mexico City and 
in this earthquake is that you have to look at each site A whole 
research needs to be embarked upon other generation of earthquake 
that really looks at these effects, what we call enhancement 
effects. That's very much going to be a concern of Los Angeles when you have a 
large earthquake because Los s a Pleistocene basin. And those 
earthquake waves are going to reverberate the softer sediments of the 
basin, and they're going to keel over in Hills, Hills, 
Torrance, that area. Actually, even though you're further away from the quake, 
those waves are going to reverberate down like they're in a big bathtub. 
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This is what happened in Mexico City in 1985, and it validated that group of 
people who had postulated this effect for a long time, the ground enhancement 
effect. That quake was 200 miles away, and it leveled every masonry structure 
14-21 stories high. 
So there's a type of structure that's going to be vulnerable, and there's a 
type of geological area that's going to be vulnerable. And just saying, "I'm 
this far from the quake; the maximum quake might be an 8.3," isn't going to be 
enough to prevent a large number of failures and collapses. I think we've been 
too smug in proximity. You say, "Well, I don't live on the San Andreas, so I'm 
not going to get hurt." This epicenter is down there in Watsonville, and it 
wipes out a freeway structure 100 kilometers away. It's the structure and the 
geology. 
We really need to fund that and take it seriously. Earthquake engineering 
funding died when I was in graduate school. It just stopped, and we started 
hazardous waste in the 1980's. So I think every time you have a major quake, 
there's going to be new lessons. We don't have enough of them records-wise. The 
first strong motion data we ever had was El Centro in 1940. The second really 
was San Fernando because Park Field and Tehachapi were out in remote areas, and 
we didn't have accelographs in those areas to give us engineering data. See, the 
seismograph data doesn't help the design engineer. As Mr. Roberts pointed out, 
that just measures energy release. That's how we get a magnitude. Those 
magnitudes don't have a lot to do with what gets knocked down and what doesn't 
get knocked down. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN EASTIN: Would you be available to assist the Legislature in 
understanding how we should develop funding for that type of research? 
DR. ROGERS: Sure, I'd be glad to, and I'm sure there's lots of other people 




ASSEMBLYWOMAN EASTIN: As I understand from your te I overheard on 
for the the radio in San Francisco that 
ss, which was not funded 
in fact had a s 
the State California. 
DR. ROGERS: That's correct. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN EASTIN: And you were not terribly surprised, as I understand 
it, that the Cypress went down. 
DR. ROGERS: I was surprised at the amount of Cypress that went down. We 
were worried about especially bents 105 to 111 in the north end, and that's where 
the greatest damage was. That's the only section that went completely down. The 
rest of the failure was a partial 
bottom deck. The bottom deck held. 
structure go down as are evidence of 
, just the deck going onto the 
two bents, 105 and 106, did the entire 
caps or foundation failure. 
That's what we were worried about in the '70's. The technology was there in the 
'70's, but the funding wasn't, to do the is. I think it's great that 
Caltrans is going to the consulting engineering community and getting that kind 
of help because I think we could real each other out. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN EASTIN: So you would suggest there are other structures in 
California, based on what we know today, that are at least of concern to you as a 
professional? 
DR. ROGERS: Yes, very much so. This data, this quake, really points this 
out. You're going to have to look at each area, a site-specific point of view, 
and spend a lot more time and money looking at the geology under that structure. 
If you look at figure 7, it will give you a real graphic representation. There's 
two stations not even a half mile from each other, Treasure Island and Yerba 
Buena. Treasure Island is part of Yerba Buena. It's a man-made fill, sand, done 
with hydraulic fill. You see one gets .06g; the other one gets .16g, almost 
three times as much. There is a proximity to the fault. 
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We have to reevaluate ground motion and ground enhancement effects, look at 
the sites with a lot more sophistication. That's going to happen with more 
records. This is going to be the most well-instrumented quake in United States 
history -- over 400 strong motion instruments in the net within 200 kilometers of 
the quake. And if Los Angeles ever has one, it's going to be even greater 
because they passed ordinances back in 1965 requiring three accelographs in every 
building over ten stories high. So Los Angeles is the most well-instrumented 
site, probably, in the United States if the not the world. Tokyo might be close. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: There's been some talk at one point about a kind of rat-tail 
affect at the end of an earthquake area. That's not the scientific term; that's 
what we used to call it in locker rooms when folks with towels would snap them. 
Is that valid? Is that just talk, or does something like that occur at the end 
of a seismic area? 
DR. ROGERS: There are some new theories that were expounded upon about 
three or four years ago by a seismologist named Dr. Robert Naylor, who lives in 
San Francisco -- he used to be with the U.S. Geological Survey that waves are 
reflected down, go along the bottom of the crust, then come up to create damage 
zones 200 miles away. 
There's a lot we still don't know. This type of quake was very different. 
It was 12 miles down. It was almost all vertical, 70 degree inclination with the 
Santa Cruz block going up. Beaches are going to rise toward the Santa Cruz side. 
And it petered out about four kilometers below the surface. So like the Whittier 
quake, it didn't even come up and break through the surface. What we have on the 
surface is just bridge spreading fractures due to the bridge being reverberated 
so much. We don't have a clean fault break like we had in 1906. It was a really 
different style of motion, but very well predicted with regard to what portion of 
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the fault was going to go and how soon. That was the 
that section of that fault. 
event in 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: So to some extent you can what s of faults are 
most likely to have events, and then also the kind of event as well? You said 
this is an unusual event since it was so deep. If someone had looked at this 
fault and made that kind of a j that there was to be an activity, is 
there a likelihood they would have come up with this, but it wouldn't have been 
12 miles deep and it wouldn't have looked like a vertical movement? 
DR. ROGERS: The u.s. has had good survey creep nets on 
San Andreas, starting around Hollister and down to Park Field. There was a 
large quake at Park Field in 1967. They've had a real net down there. They 
had expected a quake. I can't for them about what style of movement they 
expected, but we have a section of the fault that's moving and creeping. And 
this section that moved was called a locked section, a section that wasn't 
exhibiting movement so that strain built up because there was movement south of 
it and there was movement north of it. Yhat can't do is tell you exactly 
what window the quake is going to occur in. I've studied these things for years, 
and I got pretty excited after about 20 seconds of shaking because I was resolved 
to die and never experience a large quake. That was a good probability. These 
things just don't happen that often. So the awareness isn't there until after 
the catastrophe happens. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: You don't mind if most of us hope that your big moment never 
comes. You might be disappointed; we'd all be very relieved. 
DR. ROGERS: It'll come in L. A. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: But, as you say, geological windows being what they are, 
they're a little broader than windows that we're normally used to that term 
implying. 
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DR. ROGERS: Yes, we're just starting, even in the last ten ye~rs to really 
understand seismology more. There are large quakes that are going to occur in 
the Midwest, we know now. The largest fault in the United States runs between 
Charleston and Yellowstone. The largest quake in U.S. history was epicentered in 
New Madrid, Missouri in 1810. But those don't happen nearly as often as things 
on the San Andreas system. It's a very active system. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: If you were sitting where we were in terms of looking at 
freeways in Los Angeles, what would your thoughts be? Do you think freeways in 
Los Angeles are safe? 
DR. ROGERS: Freeways or bridges? 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Bridges. 
DR. ROGERS: You have to take a real hard look at bridges built, especially, 
before 1930. I was surprised to hear L.A. had so many of those. Just because it 
went through the 1933 quake at Newport/Inglewood -- that was sixteen miles off 
the coast. If the Newport/Inglewood moved closer to Baldwin Hills, you might not 
fare as well. 
You have to remember the Cypress structure, when we were study~ng it, went 
through a very sizable earthquake right when it was being built. The last 
concrete and the last section had just been poured. On March 22, 1957, we had a 
5.3 event, epicentered only 13 1/2 miles away, very close in. The structure got 
probably .lg, more than it was designed for. The concrete was wet; concrete gets 
stronger with age. The structure did fine. 
You can get a false sense of security because you went through this quake or 
went through that quake. No two quakes are the same. You've got to look at 
every single structure, every single system with that kind of individual eye; and 
the maximum credible quake might not be the quake that knocks you down. This is 
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shock load. It doesn't 
to out that one load. 
Again, duration gets there, s of motion, up and down versus s 
like that. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ As understand 
instructions do we Caltrans to build 
was a new fault. What 
, build for the maximum 
credible , when turns that it's new fault? You're to 
assume that the maximum credible some was to be 4 or 5, 
and no one knew the fault line was there. What do you do about that? 
DR. ROGERS: San Fernando, and Whittle Narrows were all faults 
that were some of which even break ground surface. 
If you go into an oil company' to be amazed as a geologist. 
You're to find out that 90% of the faults don' break the surface. So we 
say there's 112-120 active faults in California. That's about 10% of the active 
faults in California, most The maximum credible event what it does is 
say, will a large event close in on the load my structure worse 
than a far away event on the Garlock or the San Andreas? You look at those 
things, and you decide which one's going to put a greater load, a longer load. 
And the maximum event might be the San Andreas one. Most of L.A., it is, even 
though it's not as close to other faults, like the Raymond fault, Pasadena, and 
the Newport/Inglewood. So the MCE is the term to say, of all these faults we can 
choose from, we're going to choose a big event and hope that designing for that 
will hold us up in the smaller unforeseen ones like Whittier Narrows. 
ASSEMBLYMAN EAVES: I think I want to get back to what you said that 
Caltrans' program was in the right direction and they needed to do this 
site-specific; but realistically, if there's 7,000 bridges in Caltrans' system 
and x-amount wherever, what are we talking about if we're going to look at each 
one of those individually in the way of dollars? Again, it's this thing that you 
can design bridges with zero risk if you can afford to do that. When you're 
starting to retrofit 7,000 bridges, you can't just say, "Here's the standard. 
We're going to build bridges statewide." What you're saying is you have to do 
that; and in addition to that, then you have to specifically design them for the 
location they're at, based on all these varying factors. Could you give me some 
idea whether it's realistic to think that we can in fact look at all of these 
bridges, site-specific, or is that something that would be nice if we had 
unlimited funds? 
DR. ROGERS: Following the 1971 Sylmar quake, Caltrans contracted with the 
Division of Mines and Geology to produce a statewide map showing what the maximum 
base rock accelerations would be. They contracted for another more detailed map 
two years ago. That's out now. They map in zones. So the maximum credible 
bedrock acceleration might be .5g in a whole zone belt through the San Fernando 
Valley, say. Then they have to take that data and look at the geologic column 
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know and knew to this 
the numbers? This map 
accurate? Did we have a good 
to this kind of 
distribution. But in des , we look the MCE event the maximum credible 
event, of Cypress. It was a .5 on the four miles away. If 
you design for that, that's so overwhelming that something from 100 kilometers 
away actually is less than that. No, we can't predict exactly how the ground is 
going to shake in any one area, so we have to pick a big number and see if we can 
work with that. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN HANSEN: You talked about the problem with bridges and 
structures built before the 1930's. If you took another date that would be 
dangerous, going from 1930, where would you place that one? 
DR. ROGERS: 1973. Anything before 1973 were using the El Centro records. 
That's what the designers for Cypress used. That's what we used when I was in 
college. That was the only good site response spectra we had because it was the 
first site that had an accelograph on it. The accelograph was born at Cal Tech 
right about that time, in the late '30's. The seismograph was invented in the 
mid-1930's by Richter. The first seismograph record we have is the 1933 
earthquake in Long Beach. The first accelograph data we have is 1940 at El 
Centro. At the other quakes I have mentioned, like Tehachapi, which was a 7.6 in 
July 1952, we didn't have any strong motion instruments up in that area; and two 
major railroads, Santa Fe and Southern Pacific, got leveled in that quake. They 
were out of commission for weeks. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN HANSEN: The information that we get from this quake -- is it 
going to be very helpful in building the next level of technology and the maps 
that we need to draw from this point forward? 
DR. ROGERS: You bet, because we did get at least a San Andreas event. It 
wasn't a major San Andreas event. It was only a moderate one, and we have 400 
instruments. In 1940, we had three. We have 400 instruments that are close in 
to the quake. It's going to give us a lot more data to work with and synthesize 
from loading the structure to the style of loading. When I was in graduate 
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money the has --
that' more money in 
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have 
s as the 
lot more to lose. 
st metropolitan 
and have very 
probabilities of having a major quake in the next half century. We'll see how 
they do. They've put a lot more money into it, and they've had a lot more deaths 
than we've ever had. We've been extremely lucky, in '71, Sylmar, and this last 
quake, when you look at how many people were on the highways and the Norman 
Reservoir was only less than two feet from breaking. Ve could have had a lot 
more deaths. Someone is watching over us up there. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Good, thank you very much. 
Before I bring up Dr. Iwan, I'd like to ask Councilman Holden to come 
forward. He's the chairman of transportation. 
COUNCILMAN NAT HOLDEN: Thank you very much, Mr. Katz. I'm very glad that 
you're holding this hearing. I just want to share with you just briefly 
information that I was able acquire about two weeks ago when I had a hearing on 
the very same subject as it relates to I-105, the Harbor Freeway. The community 
felt that this construction going on right now was going to be double-decked, but 
it was not going to be double-decked. It was going to be an elevated freeway. 
They wanted to know whether or not it would be safe and would withstand the 
highest magnitude of an earthquake in this general area. 
Ve had come back to discuss this subject matter with us, Mr. Sammy Newel, 
who is the chief of the Office of Structural Design, Mr. James Gates, who is the 
Structural Mechanical Engineer in the Seismic Analysis Division, Caltrans, and 
Mr. C. J. O'Connell, the Deputy District Director of I-105 Project Management. 
Ve learned quite a bit. In fact, I think people who were in the room and 
heard the testimony -- their confidence level was raised. For example, we talked 
about the fact that the columns that are going to be elevated on I-105 will go 70 
feet into the ground. The I-105 is being separated, has been expanded on each 
side, building a new lane on each side, which would maintain the same traffic 
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• 
flow that we have now, which you're all familiar with. It's designed for a 
g-force of about .5 at the base. 
We talked about what maximum 
freeway could stand. The 
would come from the Fault. The 
that the elevated 
us the most g-force 
Fault is acent to that 
area; and it is des site specific, which you heard a lot about 
today. The San Andreas fault would generate about a 7 8 on the Richter Scale, 
and the Inglewood Fault about a 7. So 
developing from the maximum number at the 
are. But I'm satisfied that this pe will be a 
a worst-case situation 
fault. And that's where we 
des , given further 
that the experts who have testified before the Committee have put 
together a blue ribbon committee scient ts the State of California 
to review their des from the s of the tandards and des criteria 
that have been set. So can back after their viewing of 
findings. In about six weeks, will share that information with us. I might 
say, however, that 
built prior to the 
went on to say on the elevations that were 
in 1971, phase 1 retrofit is Phase 2 yet 
has to be done, which is another 
the safety factor. 
us a sleeve in order to increase 
The problem is that the money is not available to do all of this work 
simultaneously, so we're going to be on you and the other members of the 
Legislature to put up money so they can do their job completely. What 
they need for us to do at the local level is to allow them to close down some 
streets in order to take care of the That which we can do we will 
do. Ye made that commitment to Caltrans. But what we will need is the money. 
I'm satisfied with the elevation that we have going down I-105. I think 
it's going to be OK. They think it's going to be OK. Based on the information 
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given by the members of the committee, we will await with anticipation the report 
from the experts. The Caltrans team have strong reason to believe, however, that 
their design criteria will be validated by this new blue ribbon commission. 
That's where we stand; I just wanted to share that information with you. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Councilman, I appreciate it, and we will work with you. As 
you know, the Governor signed the $320 million yesterday. That's a start. We 
will work closely with you and try to come up with the rest of what's needed for 
the city and work out a way to do that. Thank you very much. 
I'd like to call Dr. Bill Iwan, who is a member of the Seismic Safety 
Commission. I appreciate your hanging in with us. After Dr. Iwan, we have Mr. 
Noyes from the County of Los Angeles to give a county perspective. 
DR. WILFRED IYAN: Thank you, Chairman Katz and committee members, for 
giving me the opportunity to address the Committee on behalf of the Seismic 
Safety Commission. My name is Wilfred Iwan. I'm a member of the Commission. 
I'm also a faculty member at Cal Tech. I'd like to give you some prepared 
remarks. I'll try to abbreviate them due to the lateness of the hour and just 
make the main points of what we wanted to say. 
Each strong motion earthquake that we experience is a full-scale real live 
test of our engineered structures. And somehow that test always seems to find 
the flaws and the weak links in the structures. In past earthquakes, we have 
seen very graphically that unreinforced masonry structures, both bearing wall and 
non-bearing wall, underreinforced structures, structures with soft first floors, 
inadequately tied tilt-up structures, mobilehomes, houses that are not tied to 
their foundations represent a significant seismic hazard. 
In the 1971 San Fernando earthquake - we've referenced many times the year 
1971 we saw that there were some flaws in the design of the highway 
structures and, in fact, that the current design codes and practices were not 
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adequate, As a result many programs of retrofit were Ve've heard 
reports on what Caltrans has been since that time. 
On October 17, we learned some of old ssons from past s. 
learned a few new lessons, but unfortunate the lessons that we relearned were 
the difficult ones. Ve saw that unreinforced masonry were in 
terrible shape because of And we learned that the highway 
structures were still hazardous, not the structures that were known to be 
hazardous, but some of those even newer structures that experienced some 
distress. And now it's a sad that we find that most of the lessons that 
we learned in this earthquake are lessons that we probably should have learned in 
earlier earthquakes. 
Ve've heard much this about the ss viaduct structure, and 
certainly the collapse of that structure and the associated loss of life, tells 
us that we still have a long way to go in an level of seismic 
safety for the State of California. 
Ve knew in 1971 that we had a with our structures. Ve knew 
that the codes that existed at that time were Yes, steps were taken 
• to correct those deficiencies, but now 18 years later we find that we still have 
not taken adequate steps to correct this problem. From the seismic safety policy 
point of view, this is simply unacceptable. 
The highway structures were clearly a problem in this last earthquake, but I 
think it's important we put that problem in perspective and in the proper 
context. First of all, the highway system in California is only one part of the 
overall transportation system of the state, which includes not only highways but 
also rail transportation, air, sea, and even 1 • ... ~nes. I think we need to 
realize that that's an interdependent system and that the failure of any one 
element of that system will effect the other elements as well. We should be just 
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as concerned, and I'm sure that this committee will be as concerned, with the 
failure of a control tower at SFO or backup electrical generators at that 
airport, as well as damage to a runway in Oakland that shortens the runway. We 
see these kinds of failures for an earthquake which really had levels of ground 
shaking, particularly at SFO, which were not very large. And it leads one to 
wonder what types of damage we might experience at these other transportation 
systems with the groundshaking larger. We must also look at rail transportation, 
at docks, piers, and other forms of transportation. So the first point is that 
we must realize that the highway system is only one element of our overall state 
transportation system. 
We also need to realize that the transportation system itself is only one 
element of our aging infrastructure statewide, which needs a great deal of 
attention in order to make it seismically safe. This ranges from unreinforced 
masonry buildings, of which we have a great number in the state, to unreinforced 
buildings of various heights, under-reinforced buildings, including many 
state-owned buildings. This represents a serious problem. 
We also have potentially hazardous dam structures. It's the total of all 
these problems that we need to be addressing, and it's within that context that 
we see that the highway problem is a particularly perplexing problem because it's 
only one facet of a much larger issue. The Seismic Safety Commission has learned 
that the seismic s program needs to have three elements, which are 
essential. One is an identification program, another is an effective mitigation 
plan or strategy, and the third is an action plan. 
First comes identification. We need a program that would identify the weak 
links in our infrastructure. In every case of an earthquake that we've 
experienced, there is usually a surprise. We find there was some element that 
was not as strong as it should have been. That's not acceptable. We need to be 
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able to identify those elements of our infrastructure which are weak and which 
need to be s The ss structure has been identified now by nearly 
everyone who has looked at it a very weak structure, people have also 
ly as a weak asked the question: Yhy wasn' this structure identified 
structure? Were we blinded accepted practice? Have we been asking the wrong 
questions? Have we been asking the wrong people? Yhy can't we identify 
hazardous structures? 
I don't mean to be judgmental in that regard. I think it's a very difficult 
problem, but it's a problem that we must resolve. We must find thorough and 
effective techniques for the identification of hazards, and we may need to do 
this on more than just classes of structure. We may need to identify specific 
structures, individual structures, that are hazardous. One of the problems I 
think we had to date is that we've tended to structures as being 
hazardous, and that's making it difficult to 
we can get to the place where we can ident 
specifically, it will be easier then to 
ize the greatest hazards. If 
hazardous structures more 
just which structures need to 
be addressed first, whether they be highway structures, airport structures, or 
building structures. 
I think it's interesting to note that as part of Mr. Roberts' testimony, he 
indicated that two major universities completed studies of the Cypress structure 
within less than three weeks after the event and that these studies indicated 
that there was a strong probability of collapse with an acceleration level of 
.17g. One wonders then how difficult it would have been to have determined this 
prior to the earthquake. I know that hindsight is 100%; but these questions, I 
think, need to be asked. 
The second element we need is a strong, ambitious plan for mitigation. 
Caltrans has and has had such a mitigation plan involving, as we've heard, the 
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various phases of retrofit for the structures. This strategy tended to treat 
those structures on a general basis as a class, not specifically or individually; 
and perhaps it's time that we need to look more carefully at the individual 
structures and their specific nature, the nature of the local site and so on, 
rather than just on a code basis. As one of the committee members indicated 
during this hearing, he wondered what would have happened if a group of experts 
had been asked to look specifically at the Cypress structure to see what needed 
to be done to that structure to make it seismically safe, rather than applying 
the phase 1 retrofit to that structure, which was developed for really a 
different type of engineered structure. We must come up with effective 
mitigation strategies, even if it requires, I believe, a case-by-case analysis of 
some important structures. If we don't have the technology, we need to develop 
that technology. 
Third, we need an action ; and this is, of course, a very difficult part 
because it involves money. We simply cannot wait another 18 years to solve the 
highway problems or other seismic problems that we know we have in the 
state. We must find ways to move ahead more quickly. I believe this is going to 
cost a great deal of money. A site that could cost tens of millions of dollars 
is going to cost hundreds of millions of dollars, probably is going to cost us 
billions of dollars to do the job That's a lot of money, but we have a 
choice. We can either spend some money now we can defer that and spend a lot 
more money in the future. It's clear that there has not in the past been the 
commitment to the kinds of that we need to really make a significant 
impact on seismic safety. This is partly a problem of public apathy, and maybe 
it's a problem with those of us who are pushing seismic safety. Maybe we have 
not been good enough advocates, but we need to do a better job. We need to find 
ways to fund it. Unfortunately, I can't think of a way to fund public structure 
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retrofits, except with public money. And that's to be a problem. In the 
private sector, though, we can be more creative. We can try to find methods 
which will provide incentives for individuals to do the retrofitting that 
needs to be done of many of our private structures. 
One way to speed up the process may be to let the citizens of California 
know what enormous cost is involved for not doing something. The Seismic Safety 
Commission has, as part of its five-year seismic safety , an element to 
determine the true economic cost of a significant earthquake in California. And 
that's not just the cost of rebuilding freeways or rebuilding buildings, but it's 
the cost of unemployment, dislocation, the problems of lost productivity, which 
we think will be very, very substantial. The Commission has never been able to 
get this particular study carried out. 
Finally, I would just like to mention two things that the Commission has 
found to be central to the whole process of identification and mitigation. These 
are research and independent review. We've heard a great deal about research 
this morning, and I'm pleased that that's the case. Research provides the basis 
for safe, economical, and efficient design and retrofit of structures. I'm very 
happy to see that Mr. Best expressed a commitment to research. California has 
traditionally led the nation, and some feel the world, in seismic safety 
research. However, most of the support for this research has come from the 
federal government; and recently, quite frankly, that support has waned. We are 
now receiving less research monies than we have in the past, and our research 
programs in California universities are severely impacted. The State of 
California simply must take a stronger role in seismic safety research if we are 
to solve our seismic safety problems. We are going to need to work hand in hand 
with research and education. We can do many things in research; but unless we 
educate the next generation of researchers, we will lose that capability. Right 
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now, many of our programs in California are shrinking. Ve're not educating the 
scientists and engineers as we did in the past. I'm concerned at what's going to 
happen in years to come if we don't have the basis of educated scientists and 
engineers to tackle the problems that we face. 
The next thing I would like to briefly mention is the idea of independent 
review. The Commission has found that this is a very important element of any 
seismic safety program. Again, I am pleased with the statements that have been 
made and actions that have been taken by Caltrans in this regard. Ve need 
independent review to assure a high level of seismic safety and design in 
construction. The use of independent review is not a sign of weakness or 
inadequacy on the part of the organization using this approach. On the contrary, 
it's a prudent thing to do and shows a desire to do the best possible job. Ve 
applaud the steps that Caltrans has taken to review past and present plans for 
highway structures, and we hope that this emphasis on independent review will 
continue. Ve think this is an extremely important part of the program. 
I might just add a side note, a technical note, to comment on some of the 
previous comments. Mr. Roberts commented that there's no direct relationship 
between the Richter magnitude of an earthquake and the peak acceleration that can 
be experienced at a particular site. I would like to also indicate that research 
has found that there is no direct correlation between the peak acceleration 
experienced at a site and the damage to a structure. This is a very complex, 
technical problem, and the damage involves such things as the frequency content 
of the acceleration. It also involves the duration of the acceleration, and it 
may even involve the number of times the particular structure has been subjected 
to shaking. In fact, damage may be accumulative. These are all questions that 




In conclusion, I would like to that we do not treat the lessons of the 
October 17, 1989 as we treated the lessons of the 1971 San Fernando 
earthquake. At that time, we saw the with our 
structures and with many other structure that we were building. We didn't solve 
those problems for e years, and came back to haunt us last month. It 
won't be easy, but we must find the commitment and the resources to fix the 
system now. We can't afford to wait any longer. 
Thank you. I'd be happy to answer any questions. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN EASTIN: Have you in the past had as your charte giving us a 
figure for retrofit and for replacement? 
DR. IWAN: No, we have not. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN EASTIN: Do you 
at this time? 
DR. IWAN: I don't know if it would 
lation to you that charter 
legislation. We probably could 
try to put together those kind of s without that lation. I think it's 
not something that we ever have even been asked to do. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN EASTIN: I don't think any of us want to see this politically 
driven. We don't want anybody to tell us what we want to hear, because it's a 
nice, low number. We need to fully understand what the problems are in this 
state and go about finding the resources to fix them. I don't know what those 
all are. It might be a whole host of different ways. But if we don't have a 
target -- someone once said it's better to set your target too high and miss it, 
instead of too low and hit it. California has been more or less saying that it's 
been setting its sights too low and hitt 
understand the scope of the problem. 
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it. But I think we need your he to 
DR. IVAN: I certainly would like to do that; and as I say, I'm afraid that 
when we write the bottom line, it's going to be a very large number. It's going 
to be in the billions of dollars. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN EASTIN: At the Senate , Mr. Best apparently -- the Bee 
reported -- said that after a survey, as the state stands, Caltrans concluded 
about the state's bridges that none is at a risk of collapse in what is known as 
a maximum credible earthquake. That is not your testimony today, is it? 
DR. IVAN: I'm really not testifying on the details of the engineering 
analysis of any particular bridge. I'm not capable of doing that because I 
haven't reviewed each one of those bridges. I feel that we were very fortunate 
in the earthquake that occurred on October 17 that the ground shaking in the area 
that severely damaged the freeway structures was not really as high as it could 
have been. I think we need to continuually remind ourselves of that. Just 
because certain structures there did not collapse with this kind of ground 
shaking, doesn't mean that we would consider them to be seismically safe. The 
ground shaking there could have been more like it was in Santa Cruz, and I think 
we would have seen something much more severe. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN EASTIN: I guess the thing I would say is, when we use these 
large numbers -- Caltrans today used 00-500 million, which I would question 
that figure because Caltrans does tend to give us low numbers on all their early 
estimates. But the bottom line is the repair of the freeways in California just 
from this moderate earthquake will be three or four or five or six times that. 
If we just took the money we're going to right now to clean up after our 
messes and spend it on retrofit, redes and replacement, I think we'd be money 
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MR. JAMES Y. MARSH: Mr. Chairman, ladies. I'm Jim Marsh, Regional Engineer 
with the American Institute of Steel Construction. I don't know if you realize 
that at the end of Yorld War 95% of the bridges in this state were 
steel-framed. By now, it's just the reverse; 95% are concrete. Conversely, we 
look at high-rise buildings. Today, 95% of the high-rise are steel-framed. This 
isn't by accident. I think, if you talk to any structural engineer today who's 
designing high-rise, he'll say he has a confidence in the material with 
the ability to absorb the energy. what took place in this period of 40-45 
years is very interesting in the sense that I think Caltrans became locked in on 
the bottom line of the cost per square foot of the concrete, and so they 
gradually transitioned over into that and left this state without one fabricator 
in the steel bridge business any longer. In the '50's, there were probably six 
still in existence, Pacific Murphy up in the 
some of the bridges up there and the Coronado 
Area which designed and erected 
in San Pedro. 
What I'm getting at is this: I think the time has come for Caltrans to 
start shifting their views and 
you cannot do one development without 
think it would be if Caltrans we 
at all of the des again. As you know, 
an environmental impact report. I 
to, say not only use all the designs, 
which would give you the present cost which they've been locked into before, but 
say, let's look at the total cost of all these designs, whether it be steel, 
concrete or composite systems. Look at the maintenance cost through the life of 
the structure and then add to that the retrofit cost, the site-specific 
earthquake near that 
of steel or if this 
and say, what is that going to cost if this bridge is 
is concrete? What is it going to cost in time, 
dollars and everything else to the for that bridge in the long run? Maybe 




CHAIRMAN KATZ: All right. Thank you very much. Anybody else? Members, 
thank you, and I appreciate people in the audience who stuck around and 




ASSEMBLY TRANSPORTATION COMMITTEE 
INTERIM HEARING ON 
THE SEISMIC SAFETY OF CALIFORNIA'S FREEWAY SYSTEM 
INTRODUCTION 
November 7, 1989 
Los Angeles, California 
STAFF REPORT 
The collapse of a major portion of the Cypress viaduct of the 
Nimitz Freeway (Route 880) during the October 17 Lorna Prieta 
Earthquake has focused the attention of the Legislature on the 
structural integrity of thousands of bridges statewide, 
particularly those located in high-risk earthquake areas, such as 
the San Francisco Bay Area and the Los Angeles area. 
That freeway structures (which include diverse facilities 
such as overpasses, interchange flyovers, doubledeck roadways, and 
"conventional" bridges) could be threatened by a major earthquake 
was confirmed during the February 1971 Sylmar quake which caused 
substantial damage to a number of highway facilities. The need to 
improve structural engineering practices for new facilities was 
recognized, as was the need to "retrofit" existing ones. 
Phase I Retrofit Program 
The Department of Transportation (Caltrans) developed the 
so-called "Phase I Retrofit" Program based on what it learned from 
the 1971 Sylmar earthquake. In essence, the Phase I program 




us cables, to avoid separation and collapse that might 
occur an earthquake. A structure would still have 
flexibil to move, but the amount of motion would be constrained 
acceptable parameters. 
it would take until 1987 (16 years) for Caltrans 
to complete Phase I retrofits as part of the Highway 
Rehabilitation program. Information obtained from Caltrans 
indicates 1,262 structures were retrofitted, at a cost of 
$54.2 llion ($47.3 million on state highways, and $6.9 million 
on toll bridges). At an average expenditure of approximately $3.4 
million per year, Phase I could not have been considered a major 
financial burden on the highway program. 
Just to take one year as a representative example, in 
1983-84, state highway resources were in excess of 
$1.8 billion, of which $413 million was allocated to highway 
maintenance and another $350 million was allocated to highway 
rehabil ion (support and capital outlay). An additional 
$70 million was budgeted during that year for safety capital 
outlay projects, to be spent on high-priority projects forecasted 
to reduce accidents and reduce the state's liability exposure. As 
part of the process of prioritizing capital outlay projects each 
year through the STIP (State Transportation Improvement Program) 
process, the California Transportation Commission and Caltrans 
first set aside funds for maintenance, rehabilitation, and safety 





Phase I, as its name implies, was not viewed as the end to 
seismic retrofitting. Caltrans engineers were also concerned that 
bridge columns could fail in the event of an earthquake, resulting 
in bridge collapse. The Phase I solution was primarily designed 
to tie bridge superstructures together at hinges and supports, but 
would do little if bridge columns sheared and collapsed. 
Caltrans has offered two explanations for deferring action on 
column failure: first, columns performed well during the 1971 
Sylmar Quake, and second, developing engineering solutions for 
column retrofits was more of a challenge than the Phase I program. 
To assist in research and development, a $418,000 contract was 
awarded to the University of California, San Diego, late in 1987. 
The Whittier Earthguake and Phase II 
The Whittier Earthquake of October 1, 1987 provided a new 
impetus to "get moving" on Phase II. The focus was on the damaged 
Route 605/5 interchange in Los Angeles County, where Phase I 
improvements averted a major collapse but where columns were found 
to be vulnerable. According to a October 19, 1987 Caltrans memo, 
"if this structure had been supported on single column bents, 
rather than the 5-column bent, it probably would have collapsed" 
(Memo of W.E. Schaefer, Deputy Director, Project Development to 
Caltrans Director Leo Trombatore). Phase II, then, was to be a 
retrofit program for single-column structures consisting of steel 




conceptualized (but has yet to be developed) as a retrofit program 
multi-column structures such as the ill-fated Nimitz 
In late 1987, Caltrans requested the California 
Transportation Commission (CTC) to set aside $64 million for 
Phase II retrofits over a four-year period (an average of $16 
million per year), and anticipated that, "contracts can be 
advertised as early as July 1, 1988." (Memo of W. E. Schaefer, 
Op. cit). While the CTC agreed and approved this funding level, 
Caltrans did not submit any projects for funding in 1988-89. In 
the current year (89-90), Caltrans has had only two projects 
(total cost: $1.2 million) ready to go as of last month ($724,000 
for the Route 57/60 interchange in the City of Industry, and 
$433,000 for the Route 405/710 interchange in Long Beach). The 
CTC advises that an additional $1 million will be requested in 
December. Thereafter, the next group of Phase II retrofit 
projects is unlikely to be ready "for advertisement" until the 
summer of 1990. The delay in this project schedule has been 
questioned. 
The cost estimates to complete Phase II have also risen 
sharply. Caltrans has identified approximately 700 structures 
requiring a Phase II retrofit; it is now clear that the 100 
largest projects alone will consume the $64 million originally 





Phase III - No Engineering Solution In Sight? 
Phase III, as conceptualized, was to retrofit bridges with 
multiple-column supports, such as the double-deck sections of the 
Nimitz Freeway (Route 880) in Oakland, and the Embarcadero Freeway 
(Route 480), the Southern Freeway Extension (Route 280), and the 
Central Freeway (Route 101) in San Francisco. Portions of the San 
Francisco double-deck structures were severely damaged during the 
Lorna Prieta Earthquake, and it is not yet clear that all of these 
structures can be repaired or when they will reopen. 
these structures are on relatively unstable Bay fill. 
Most of 
Cal trans 
officials, responding to post-earthquake inquiries as to why this 
phase was not yet underway, stated that appropriate engineering 
solutions have not been developed. 
Most attention has been focused on the state highway system. 
There are also many older bridges owned by local agencies; the 
City of Los Angeles alone is responsible for 416 bridges and is 
developing a $112 million seismic upgrade program at this time. 
Special Session Developments 
At the just-concluded special session, the Legislature 
approved AB 38X and SB 36X, which provide emergency funding for an 
accelerated statewide bridge seismic assessment and retrofit 
program. The temporary sales tax will provide $80 million in 
state funds: $60 million to match an additional $240 million in 
federal funds for the state highway system and $20 million for 




to assessment of retrofit needs (including local road, rail 
transit, and pedestrian bridges). To highlight the importance of 
this sue and to guard against fund diversion for other highway 
purposes, these new revenues will be deposited in a newly-created 
separate account, the Seismic Safety Retrofit Account in the State 
Transportation Fund. While Caltrans will seek federal matching 
funds, additional state resources will undoubtedly be needed as 
well to reassure the people of California that our bridges are as 






DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS 
LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT 
OF PUBLIC WORKS 
ADOPTED BY THC BOARD OF 
PUBLIC WORKS OF THE CITY 
. of Los California 
A~~o .THE MAYOR 
>:iCJ BUREAU OF ENGINEERING 
REPORT NO. 1, Section 1 A:m REFERRED TO THE CITY COUNCIL 
~?)~ 
t:::/ Secretary 
November 3. 1989 
CD# ALL 
SEISMIC STRENGTHENING OF EXISTING BRIQGES 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Adopt this report and forward it to the Mayor and City Council 
requesting that: 
1. Appropriate action be taken to provide funding for the 
strengthening of existing City bridges to provide protection 
against major seismic episodes, with an estimated cost of 
$150,000,000. 
2. Authorize the addition of 15 structural engineering and 
geologist positions in the Bureau of Engineering to do the 
necessary design work and that $350,000 be appropriated from 
salary savings to fund these positions for the balance of the 
fiscal year. 
3. Authorize the Bureau to issue Requests for Proposals (RFPs) for 
the hiring of consultants to assist the Bureau in analysis and 
design preparation. Funding for the work to be included in the 
1990-91 budget • 
4. Authorize $2, 100, ooo for accelerating the design completion 
and construction of the restrainer program. 
TRANSMITTALS 
1. Copy of letter from Mayor Tom Bradley dated October 24, 1989, 
asking that all bridges in the City be inspected and 
recommendations for strengthening be presented. 
2. Priority List of Future Seismic Strengthening Projects. 
3. Earthquake Priority List of Multi-Span Vehicular Bridges owned 
by City of Los Angeles Only dated October 27, 1989. 
DISCUSSION 
The City's infrastructure is a fragile system that can readily be 
affected by major seismic events. The Santa Cruz earthquake on 
October 17, 1989, re-emphasized this condition by causing major 
damage to bridges almost 60 miles from the epicenter. For this 
reason a new urgency as expressed in the Mayor's letter has 
developed to extend and complete the City's Seismic Strengthening 
of Bridges program (Transmittal No. 1). 
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71 earthquake, a re-evaluation of design criteria was 
what changes would have to be made to protect 
As a result of that study it was determined 
restrainers be added to certain bridges. These 
essentially tie the structure together so that the 
not 1 apart. This work has proceeded slowly :because 
limitations. The status of this work is as follows: 
ects completed: 
ects approved for 
Construction:. 










there are 1,014 bridges of which 416 are City 
, there are 15 vehicular tunnels, 221 pedestrian 
other structures. 
structures are inspected on a regular basis to assure that 
are ly sound. It is to be noted that not all of 
major structures. 
bridge constructed in the City is the North 
which was built in 1909. During the next 23 years 
were constructed. These bridges are generally those 
cross Los Angeles River. 
is the 6th Street Bridge which is 3,584 feet 
1932 and carries about 12,100 cars per day. 
traveled . bridge among these bridges is the 
Viaduct over Riverside Drive and Los Angeles 
s bridge carries 41,200 vehicles per day. 
bridges owned by the City of Los Angeles are 
the Los Angeles River located between Washington 
North Broadway. These bridges carry an average daily 
21,300 vehicles per day. 
studies have been made by various agencies to further 
the ility of bridge structures subject to seismic 
City staff has been and will continue working with 
doing our bridge strengthening studies and will be 
resources in pursuing this program. As a result of 
these studies, staff has made a preliminary list of bridges 
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List of Multi-Span Vehicular owned 
by the Los Angeles only (Transmittal No. 3) 136 
bridges require strengthening. Multi-span bridges are 
usually ical in major earthquakes than the typical 
smal s structures. The current estimated cost of 
strengthening 136 multi-span bridges is approximately 
$111,000,000. The estimate for strengthening the remaining City 
bridges is not expected to exceed $40,000,000. The estimates have 
been made without detailed analysis and the actual costs could 
increase s ficantly if some bridges require total replacement. 
The converse also true that the dollar amount could be less if 
the bridges, a examination, are found to meet current codes. 
Finane 
tax, general 
accomplished by either an increase in the gas 
bonds, or possibly revenue bonds. 
,000,000 estimated cost and with construction 
an increase in the gas tax ~f three cents 
the City to generate $15,000,000 per year of 
present program. However, proposals to greatly 
of the program will reduce the funds available 
If the modifications to the program are 
that it will require six cents per gallon 
$15,000,000 per year seismic strengthening 
igation bonds sold over a ten 
an additional $1,200,000 per year the 
approximately $13,100,000 after the tenth year 
This assumes concurrent retirement debt 
If the bonds are revenue bonds funded by gasoline taxes and issued 
over ten years first year will require approximately 0.5 
per gallon, increasing to 4.75 cents at the end of ten years. The 
proposed new gas tax allocation is assumed in these figures. 
It is recommended that the following 15 positions be approved to 
do the necessary design work and construction management: 
1 Structural Engineer 
4 Structural Engineering Associates 
3 Civil Engineering Assistants 
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2 Engineering Drafting Technicians 
2 Engineering Associates 
1 Typist 
Soils and Geology 
1 Assistant Engineering Geologist 
1 Engineering Geologist 
. . 
Consultants will be needed in the first three years of the program 
to give an early surge to the evaluation of the critical bridges 
and to provide a backlog of construction documents. Funding for 
the consultants will not be required until the 1990-91 fiscal year 
because of the time required to develop, circulate, receive and 
evaluate the RFPs; hold interviews; negotiate and execute 
contracts~ and start work. The process takes a minimum of six 
months. The consultant services will cost an estimated $2,000,000 
per year. 
If it is determined that general obligation bonds are to be the 
source of funding, it is recommended that additional funds in an 
estimated amount of $50,000,000 be included to reinforce existing 
City building facilities. These projects are not eligible for gas 
tax financing. 
( RKH RHK ) 
Report by: 
STRUCTURAL ENGINEERING DIVISION 







ROBERT S. HORII 
CITY ENGINEER 
-99-
DEPARTMENT OF NSP RTATI 
OFFICE OF THE 
20 N STREET 










e Ri Katz, Chairman 
ransportation Committee 
t Room 31l6 
95814 
RrL 
s in response to your letter of October 20, 1989 
rma ion relating to our seismic retrofit program. 
the same sequence as the questions on page two 
to ermine retrofit priorities has been based 
rge extent on our experience in previous earthquakes 
the 1971 San Fernando event). These ear kes 
that our largest problem was keeping the bridges 
their expansion joints (i.e., primari hinges 
ments and intermediate bents). 
usion was derived from a thorough investigation of 
Fernando earthquake after 1971 and has been supported 
erience in subsequent events such as the 980 
fshore earthquake, the 1986 Palm Springs 
and the 1987 Whittier earthquake. 
pas earthquakes showed us that brid 
prior to 1971 were most vulnerable from the r 
ling apart and that this type of failure cou d 
ives and cause serious property damage ter the 
ke, a survey of our bridge inventory identified 
30 bridges which contained narrow, unrestrained 
i n joints. These factors caused us to make the 
fit of our unrestrained expansion joints our number one 
ity. This effort is now complete and all vulnerable 
t r out the State have been restrained. 
past earthquakes identified that the second most 
area of concern was the integrity of the s n e 
ver ca column members which support the bridges. The 1971 
San Fernando earthquake showed that our narrow single column 
bridges were more vulnerable to damage than our wider multi-
c type bridges. Since that time no earthquake (including 
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the 1987 Whittier earthquake) has indicated that any of our 
single column bents were in danger of collapse. Modern 
computer analysis, however, is beginning to provide us with 
insight into the extremely complex performance of the single 
column type bridge and our conclusions are that retrofitting 
to improve the ductility of single column bridges is prudent 
in order to increase the serviceability of the bridge. 
All remaining bridges (primarily multi-column type 
structures) were designated to be included in Phase 3 of our 
retrofit program. These bridges sustained damage in previous 
earthquakes but did not collapse. At the completion of Phase 
3, every bridge within the highest seismic zones of the State 
will have been screened and evaluated and these bridges will 
have the same factor of safety as all bridges constructed to 
modern seismic standards. 
2) Bridge Retrofit Prioritization 
Phase 1 -- Bridges were identified by screening the 
approximately 15,000 bridges on the State system for 
vulnerable expansion joint details identified as a result of 
the 1971 San Fernando earthquake. Vulnerable details 
included narrow support lengths, weak bearings, etc. These 
bridges were placed on a needs list and prioritized based on 
the following considerations: 
o Seismic Potential 
o Replacement Cost 
o Replacement Cost Relative to Retrofit Cost 
o Available Detour Length 
o Average Daily Traffic 
o Defense Route On or Under the Bridge 
o Major Route On or Under the Bridge 
o Facility Crossed (State Route, Federal Route, 
Railroad) 
Projects (contracts) were developed by combining several of 
the prioritized bridges based on geographic proximity to each 
other. Project priorities varied but every attempt was made 
to include the highest priority bridges in the earliest 
projects. 
Phase 2 -- By this time we had a better understanding as to 
where earthquakes would most likely cause damage to bridges, 
thus the list of bridges to be screened and prioritized was 
limited to those within the 0.5g contour lines surrounding 
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High potential faults included in this screening were: 
Whittier, Elsinore, Whittier-Elsinore, Newport-Inglewood, 
Malibu Coast-Santa Monica-Raymond, Simi-Santa Rosa, 
Northridge, Santa Ynez, More Ranch-Arroyo Parida-San 
Cayetano, Red Mountain, Pitas Point-Ventura, Oakridge, San 
Andreas (South), San Jacinto, Mission Creek, Brawley, Brawley 
South, Clark, Coyote Creek, Superstition Hills, Superstition 
Mountain, Imperial, White Mountain North, White Mountain 
South, Fish Mountain, Owens Valley, Independence, Sierra 
Nevada, Hayward, Rodgers Creek, San Andreas (San Francisco 
South), Sargent, Zayante-Vergales, San Andreas (South of Cape 
Mendocino), Little Salmon-Yager, Mad River and Patricks Point 
as defined on the Division of Mines and Geology Map Sheet 45 
(1987). 
This resulted in a list of about 2,500 single column type 
bridges. Prioritization of these bridges was based on: 
o Fault Proximity (Ground Acceleration) 
o Age of Bridge (pre- or post-1971) 
o Length of Bridge 
o Average Daily Traffic 
o Route Type Crossed (Interstate, Federal, State, 
County, City) 
o Available Detour Length 
o Skew of Bridge 
Over 500 bridges have already been identified from the list 
of 2,500, however, screening is still underway and it is 
anticipated that about 700 bridges will comprise the final 
Phase 2 list. The screening process includes a review of 
portions of the original plans by at least three engineers 
who recommend inclusion or exclusion from the program based 
on our past damage experience combined with our recent 
analytical knowledge. 
Projects (contracts) are being developed by combining several 
of the prioritized bridges based on geographic proximity to 
each other. To date approximately 100 bridges have been 
assigned a project status and work is currently underway to 
assemble the remaining bridges into projects. Project 
priorities vary but every attempt is being made to include 
the highest priority bridges in the earliest projects. 
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Phase 3 -- The prioritization of the rema1n1ng bridges inside 
the 0.5g contour surrounding the high potential faults has 
just begun and will be modified based on what we are learning 
from the effects of the Lorna Prieta earthquake. All 
multi-level viaduct structures will be given the highest 
priority in this effort and work will proceed immediately on 
preparation of retrofit contracts for these bridges. 
Concurrent with the retrofit of these multi-level viaducts, 
we will be receiving input from our contracted research at 
the University of California at Berkeley in order to verify 
the effectiveness of the retrofit measures and techniques. 
All prioritization of the Phase 3 program will be similar to 
the Phase 2 effort except that the multi-level facilities 
will be given the highest priority. Completion of the Phase 
3 program will mean that every bridge inside the 0.5g contour 
of the high potential faults will have been given a detailed 
scrutiny and retrofit when required. 
3) Phase 1 seismic retrofit projects were submitted as 
candidates for financing as rehabilitation projects and 
competed with other highway safety projects for funding. The 
Department spent about $54 million on these projects at a 
rate of $3 to $4 million per year. In all previous 
earthquakes, there had been two deaths related to State 
highways and bridges. The retrofit program process was 
considered as part of the total highway safety package. This 
included fixes to ''blood allies" that claimed hundreds of 
lives annually in traffic accidents. Obviously, Caltrans' 
priorities are now being revised. 
4) We presently have an initial four-year Phase 2 program of $64 
million which is included in the 1988 State Transportation 
Improvement Program (STIP). This program will retrofit 
single column bents. Detail design is underway on 30 
projects and the first two were funded by the CTC during 
their October 1989 meeting. Construction will commence in a 
few months. Substantial additional funds will be necessary 
to complete work on all prioritized single column bridges. 
The CTC first allocated funding for Phase 2 in December 1987. 
The needed research contracts (testing of 1/2 scale models) 
were underway early in 1987 but actual model testing was not 
begun until mid-1988. Design was commenced in the Spring of 
1988 with plans completed later that year. 
5) Phase 1 -- Attachment A is a list of bridges where Phase 1 
retrofit was accomplished, sorted by districts. Southern 
California could be defined as districts 7, 8, and 11. The 
recently established District 12 is not segregated. 
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Phase 2 -- Attachment B is a list of Phase 2 candidates 
sorted by District, County, Route. 
Phase 3 -- In addition to the two-level structures, 
Embarcadero Viaduct, Central Viaduct, Southern Viaduct and 
China Basin Viaduct in San Francisco, all other multi-column 
bridges are candidates. We have identified 5,000+ 
(Attachment C) such bridges on the State System. -
From experience gained at the San Fernando earthquake, we 
clearly felt that keeping bridges on the bearings was the 
most important retrofit we could perform. We immediately 
proceeded with this program on a statewide basis while 
continually improving our analytical technology and 
construction details. We feel this program has saved many 
bridges during subsequent seismic events. 
The single column bent program lacked the analytical 
technology until 1987. Without that and the retrofit 
research and model testing, we would have been shooting in 
the dark for techniques to use for retrofitting columns. 
Phase is complete. 
Phase 2 Research is approximately half complete 
95 percent of needs identified 
25 percent programmed by project and in various 
stages of design 
Two projects voted by CTC -- construction to start 
in early 1990 
Phase 3 Just starting to identify needs list 
Research is commencing immediately 
6) Yes, the Department is preparing an expedited program for 
retrofitting structures. We are nearing completion of Phase 
2 retrofit research. Funding for the first contracts has 
been approved and construction should be completed by the end 
of 1992. We are initiating immediate research with UC 
Berkeley for Phase 3, the multi-column bents, which will 
identify failure modes and details requiring retrofitting. 
We anticipate that many of the retrofit techniques developed 
in Phase 2 will be used in the Phase 3 program. In essence 
the old concepts of Phases 2 and 3 are being changed. We are 
expediting review and analysis of bridges identified for 
Phase 3. Phase 2 and Phase 3 will overlap as much as 
possible; however, the Phase 3 research will take a couple of 
years. Meanwhile we can get some projects underway by the 
middle of 1991. Until we have a better idea of the retrofit 
actions that will be necessary, no accurate cost estimates 
can be made. Completing all high-priority bridges will cost 
several hundred million dollars. 
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7) In a maximum credible earthquake, we expect that our 
structures will sustain damage but will not collapse. We are 
reviewing our bridges with the new knowledge that we are 
acquiring, and at this time we have no reason to believe that 
any one of the structures is unsafe. 
All of the highway structures constructed since 1971, 
including the Harbor Transitway, were or are being 
constructed using the details which evolved from the San 
Fernando earth-quake and have been designed using the very 
latest seismic design criteria. In conjunction with District 
7, in Los Angeles, we are conducting a peer review of the 
Harbor Transitway plans prior to the start of construction on 
the structure itself. 
The "4 level" interchange has been retrofitted with catcher 
blocks at the abutment to keep the structure on its supports. 
The substructure is of the multi-column type with several 
additional diaphragms connecting adjacent frames. This 
interchange experienced no identifiable damage in either the 
Whittier or the San Fernando earthquakes. We do not expect 
any damage such as occurred at Cypress Street to occur at 
this location. This bridge is safe for public traffic. 
We will certainly include these bridges in our review for the 
Phase 2 and Phase 3 retrofit programs as we will all other 
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TESTIMONY 
WILLIAM LEONARD, VICE-CHAIRMAN 
CALIFORNIA TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION 
ASSEMBLY TRANSPORTATION COMMITIEE 
NOVEMBER 7, 19891NTERIM HEARING 
LOS ANGELES 
• I AM PLEASED FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO APPEAR BEFORE THE ASSEMBLY 
TRANSPORTATION COMMITIEE ON BEHALF OF OUR CHAIRMAN, JOE DUFFEL, 
REPRESENTING THE CALIFORNIA TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION. 
ON OCTOBER 17TH AT 5:04PM OUR FELLOW CALIFORNIANS EXPERIENCED A 
DISASTER OF IMMENSE PROPORTIONS. THIS EVENT WHICH WE HAVE LONG 
DREADED THROUGHOUT CALIFORNIA BROUGHT DEVASTATION TO ONE OF 
THE LOVELIEST AND MOST HISTORIC AREAS OF OUR STATE- THE SAN 
FRANCISCO BAY AREA. IN SPITE OF THE INCREDIBLE DESTRUCTION THERE 
WAS MUCH TO GIVE THANKS. THE IMMEDIATE REACTION OF CAL TRANS, 
STATE AND LOCAL OFFICIALS, AND OUR FELLOW CITIZENS IN THE BAY AREA 
DID MUCH TO MITIGATE THE LOSS AND SUFFERING. IT IS WELL TO BEAR IN 
MIND AS WE SEEK SOLUTIONS TO THIS TERRIBLE TOLL, AN EARTHQUAKE OF 
SIMILAR MAGNITUDE IN ARMENIA LAST YEAR CAUSED THE LOSS OF LIFE TO 
25,000 PEOPLE. 
ON OCTOBER 18TH, THE DAY FOLLOWING, CAL TRANS BRIEFED THE 
COMMISSION ON THE EVENTS OF THE PREVIOUS DAY AND THEIR 
ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION. AT THAT MEETING THE COMMISSION 
ADOPTED TWO POLICIES REGARDING EMERGENCY REPAIR FUNDING WHICH 
WERE IMMEDIATELY COMMUNICATED TO THE GOVERNOR, THE LEGISLATIVE 
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LEADERSHIP AND THE CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION. IN SUMMARY THOSE 
POLICIES ARE: 
2 
1. ANY STATE FUNDING FOR EMERGENCY REPAIRS AND RESTORATION OF 
THE STATE'S TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM SHOULD COME FROM THE 
GENERAL FUND EMERGENCY RESERVE FUND RATHER THAN THE STATE 
HIGHWAY ACCOUNT. THERE IS FRANKLY NO OTHER CHOICE FOR PRIOR 
TO THE EARTHQUAKE WE HAD ALREADY ADVISED THE APPROPRIATE 
OFFICIALS THAT THE STATE HIGHWAY ACCOUNT WOULD LIKELY BE 
DEPLETED BY THE END OF THE CURRENT BUDGET YEAR. 
2. THAT THOSE RESTRICTIONS ON FEDERAL EMERGENCY REPAIR 
HIGHWAY FUNDS BE EASED TO PERMIT AN APPROPRIATE FEDERAL 
RESPONSE. THOSE RESTRICTIONS INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING FIVE 
POINTS: 
(1) ·CURRENT $100 MILLION CAP BE RAISED 
(2) MORE REVENUE SHOULD BE ADDED TO THE EMERGENCY REPAIR 
FUND 
(3) CURRENT 90 DAY WAIVER OF STATE MATCH SHOULD BE EXTENDED 
(4) EMERGENCY REPAIR FUND SHOULD NOT BE CREDITED AGAINST A 
STATE'S GUARANTEED MINIMUM RETURN OF FEDERAL FUNDING 
(5) TOLL FACILITIES SHOULD BE ELIGIBLE FOR EMERGENCY REPAIR 
FUNDS 
WE ARE PLEASED THAT THIS COMMITTEE PLAYED A MAJOR ROLE IN 
BRINGING HOME THE BACON. AS YOU KNOW FOR THIS TRAGEDY THE 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT DID 
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2. THAT THE 90 DAY WAIVE OF STATE MATCH HAS BEEN EXTENDED TO 180 
DAYS. 
3. TOLL ROADS ARE ELIGIBLE FOR EMERGENCY REPAIR FUNDS. 
4. THESE FUNDS WON'T BE CHANGED AGAINST FUTURE 
APPORTIONMENTS TO CALIFORNIA. 
IF CALIFORNIA IS TO MAXIMIZE THE FEDERAL BENEFITS THAT HAVE BEEN 
MADE AVAILABLE IT IS INCUMBENT THAT WE NOW MOVE WITH DESPATCH. 
AT THE COMMISSION MEETING ON THE 19TH, WE MADE THE NECESSARY 
FINDINGS TO PERMIT EMERGENCY FERRY SERVICE TO OPERATE WITHOUT 
VIOLATING ANY COVENANTS ON THE TOLL BRIDGE BONDS. 
REHABILITATION OF THE CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY AND FREEWAY SYSTEM HAS 
ALWAYS BEEN ASSIGNED THE HIGHEST PRIORITY FOR AVAILABLE FUNDING. 
SEISMIC RETROFIT PROJECTS ARE A PART OF THE REHABILITATION 
PROGRAM. AS INDIVIDUAL PROJECTS HAVE BEEN READIED BY CAL TRANS 
FOR CONSTRUCTION, THE COMMISSION WITHOUT EXCEPTION HAS 
ALLOCATED CONSTRUCTION FUNDS SO THAT CONTRACTS COULD BE 
AWARDED. IN RECENT YEARS OF FUNDING SHORTAGES IT HAS BEEN 
NECESSARY TO CURTAIL NEW CAPACITY PROJECTS IN ORDER TO ASSURE 
THAT REHABILITATION INCLUDING SEISMIC RETROFIT COMES FIRST. 
3 
LET ME QUICKLY SUM UP THE BRIDGE SEISMIC RETROFIT PROGRAM. FROM 
THE LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE SAN FERNANDO EARTHQUAKE CAL TRANS 
WAS AUTHORIZED TO DEVELOP A RETROFIT PROGRAM ON SELECTED 
BRIDGES THAT EITHER HAD NARROW BEARING SEATS OR TALL UNSTABLE 
BEARINGS IN AREAS OF HIGH SEISMIC POTENTIAL. PHASE 1 IS 99% 
COMPLETE. THERE WERE 1262 BRIDGES IN THIS PROGRAM WHICH HAS COST 
SLIGHTLY IN EXCESS OF $54 MILLION. CURRENTLY 13 ARE UNDER CONTRACT 
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AND THE LAST KNOWN ONE IS UNDER DESIGN. THIS LAST PROJECT IS AN 
UPGRADE OF A PREVIOUS HINGE RESTRAINER PROJECT. 
PHASE 2 WAS APPROVED BY THE COMMISSION FOR INCLUSION IN THE 1988 
STIP IN DECEMBER 1987. THIS SECOND RETROFIT PROGRAM WAS TO 
CORRECT THE LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE 1987 WHITTIER EARTHQUAKE. 
THIS PROGRAM ENTAILED THE STRENGTHENING OF SINGLE COLUMN 
STRUCTURES THROUGH THE USE OF METAL JACKETS. A TOTAL OF $64 
MILLION WAS PROGRAMMED FOR AN ESTIMATED 767 BRIDGES TO BE 
COMPLETED OVER A FOUR-YEAR PERIOD. NOW THAT PROJECT REPORTS 
ARE COMING INTO HEADQUARTERS IT IS MY PERSONAL BELIEF THAT THE $64 
MILLION WILL PROVE TO BE MOST INADEQUATE AND THE FINAL COST FOR 
THESE BRIDGES WILL MORE THAN LIKELY BE IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD OF 
$200 MILLION. IN FACT, CAL TRANS NOW ESTIMATED THAT THE ENTIRE $64 
MILLION ALREADY PROGRAMMED WILL BE CONSUMED BY THE FIRST 100 OF 
THESE BRIDGES. THE FIRST TWO OF THESE PROJECTS TOTALING $1.2 
MILLION WAS APPROVED AT OUR OCTOBER 1989 MEETING. AS IS TRUE ON 
ANY NEW PROGRAM, PROJECT REPORTS, THE NECESSARY RESEARCH, 
TESTING, AND DESIGN ALL REQUIRE A GREAT DEAL OF LEAD TIME. THE 
COMMISSION HAS ASKED THE DEPARTMENT FOR AN UPDATED SCHEDULE 
AND COST AND TO ADVISE THE COMMISSION WHAT EFFORTS CAN BE MADE 
TO ACCELERATE THIS PROGRAM. 
AT THE OCTOBER MEETING THE COMMISSION WAS ADVISED OF A PHASE 3 
CATEGORY WHICH INCLUDES THOSE HIGHWAY BRIDGES WITH MULTIPLE 
COLUMNS THAT REQUIRE SEISMIC RETROFIT ATTENTION FOR WHICH THERE 
IS NO SPECIFIC ENGINEERING SOLUTION YET DECIDED ON. THE NIMITZ IS AN 
UNFORTUNATE EXAMPLE OF THIS CATEGORY. PHASE 31S CERTAINLY A NEW 
CATEGORY. THE LESSONS LEARNED FROM BOTH THE SYLMAR AND THE 
WHITTIER EARTHQUAKES DID NOT INDICATE A POSSIBLE FAILURE INTO THE 
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MULTI-COLUMN STRUCTURES THAT THIS PHASE WILL DEAL WITH. THE 
COMMISSION HAS ASKED TO BE ADVISED OF THE SPECIFIC LOCATIONS THAT 
FALL WITHIN THIS CATEGORY. 
IN CONCLUSION LET ME MAKE A PERSONAL OBSERVATION. THE SAN 
FRANCISCO EARTHQUAKE OF OCTOBER 17TH IS A CATASTROPHE THAT WILL 
LONG BE REMEMBERED. NO ONE KNOWS PRECISELY WHEN OR WHERE THE 
NEXT EARTHQUAKE WILL BE CENTERED, THOUGH WE DO KNOW WITH A HIGH 
DEGREE OF CERTITUDE THAT THERE WILL BE ANOTHER. ONE THING WE DO 
KNOW IS THAT THERE WILL BE FREQUENT AND CONTINUING CATASTROPHES 
THAT WILL HEAVILY IMPACT THE MOTORING PUBLIC. IT MAY BE FIRE, FLOOD, 
SLIPPAGE, FOG WITH THE RESULTANT MULTI-CAR PILE UP OR EVEN A SINGLE 
CAR ACCIDENT. WHATEVER, IT CERTAINLY IS A TRAGEDY TO THOSE 
INVOLVED. THE COMMISSION IS VERY SENSITIVE TO THOSE CONCERNS. 
MOST EVERY CAPITAL PROJECT WE AUTHORIZE IS A SAFETY PROJECT, 
DESIGNED TO SAVE LIVES AND PROTECT PROPERTY. WE ONLY VOTE 
AMENITY PROJECTS SUCH AS SOUND ATTENUATION WALLS OR 
I LANDSCAPING WHEN ITS MANDATED OR ITS THE PRICE OF GETTING FEDERAL 
FUNDS FOR A PROJECT THAT MEETS THE CRITERIA OF PROTECTING PEOPLE 
AND PROPERTY. THE COMMISSION IS FIRMLY COMMITTED TO THE 
1 NECESSITY OF ASSURING A SAFE, RELIABLE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM 
WHOSE MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR IS ADEQUATELY FUNDED AS A PRIORITY 
OVER AND ABOVE OTHER INVESTMENTS IN THAT SYSTEM. 
IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT ADDITIONAL FUNDING BE PROVIDED TO FULLY 
REIMBURSE THE EMERGENCY EXPENDITURES FROM THE SEVERELY LIMITED 
STATE HIGHWAY ACCOUNT. WE MUST NOT ONLY RAISE SUFFICIENT FUNDS 
TO REPAIR THE EARTHQUAKE DAMAGE, BUT TO SHORE UP DAMAGED 
ROADWAYS TO AVOID FUTURE FAILURES AND TO PROVIDE CONGESTION 
RELIEF AND ACCELERATE OUR SEISMIC RETROFIT PROGRAM. CAL TRANS 
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E. In private practice for the past 10 years and frequent lec-
turer for five universities and numerous government agencies. 
BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CYPRESS STRUCTURE 
The failed Cypress double-deck freeway structure was constructed in 1955-
57 in two main contracts as part of then State Route 17, or Eastshore 
Freeway. Route 17 was conceived by the State Division of Highways in the 
late 1940's. The highway's northern terminus was in the Oakland Distribu-
tion Structure, a complex interchange connecting four freeways/expressways 
with the Oakland-Bay Bridge. The southern terminus of the highway was at 
its juncture with the Bayshore Freeway {U.S. 101, in San Jose). Actual 
construction of the route began in 1949 and was completed some 10 years 
later, whereupon it was renamed the "Nimitz Freeway", after Fleet Admiral 
Chester W. Nimitz, whose family had long resided in nearby Berkeley. The 
Nimitz retained its nomenclature as State Route 17 until 2-1/2 years ago 
when it was redesignated as Interstate Route 880, or I-880. 
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A structural kingpin of the Nimitz was the Cypress double-deck viaduct at 
the freeway's junction with the Oakland Distribution Structure. Design by 
the Division of Highway's Bridge Department in Sacramento began in 1951, 
with the final plans being issued in late 1954. In the early 1950's, com-
muter and commercial traffic traveling up the East Bay toward the Bay 
Bridge or points north swung around the congestion of downtown Oakland, 
along a broad, 6-lane boulevard named Cypress Street, which had been 
widened and improved in the mid-1930's and late 1940's. The Cypress cor-
ridor was then carrying approximately 50,000 vehicles per day (on a 24-
hour basis during weekdays). 
The Bridge Department design team was headed by the late Stewart Mitchell 
under the direction of Chief Bridge Engineer Frederick W. Panhorst. This 
duo was very experienced, having designed the Oakland-Bay Bridge, the 
graceful concrete arch spans on the Big Sur Highway, over the Arroyo Seco 
in Pasadena, and virtually every freeway project since the first, the 
Pasadena, which was opened in 1940. A younger engineer, Clayton R. 
Giroux, had joined the Bridge Department in 1948, and he eventually became 
the Project Designer and a specialist in double-deck freeways, later 
designing San Francisco's similar Central and Embarcadero freeways. 
Giroux retired from CALTRANS in 1986 (and does not need to be bothered by 
the Press; he is actively co-operating with members of the various inves-
tigating teams). 
Design concepts for a modern freeway, running through what was then (1951) 
a pricy heavy industrial area, were extremely complicated. Over a 1.3 
mile distance, the proposed route had to cross 24 existing city streets, 3 
railroad spurs serving industry, miss the Oakland Army Base railroad yard, 
access to the Southern Pacific Railroad Depot, and just skirt the largest 
sewage treatment plant in the East Bay, with dozens of incoming sewer 
trunk lines. In addition, the 6 existing lanes of the Cypress commuter 
corridor must necessarily remain open during freeway construction so as 
not to create intolerable (not to mention politically unacceptable) con-
gestion. 
The compromise reached by the bridge design team was to create an extended 
double-deck structure, not to unlike those emanating from the San Fran-
cisco anchorage of the Bay Bridge (built in 1934-37). A doubly-supported 
deck structure possessed a number of important advantages: 
A. It required the least amount of right-of-way, thereby saving 
the State land acquisition money. At this time, the heavy in-
dustrial properties in that area, such as steel fabricating 
plants, would have been very expensive to condemn and relo-
cate. 
B. An elevated freeway would create the least disruption to the 
neighborhood's well-established infrastructure (railroads, 
commuter rail lines, streets, trolley lines, buried 
utili ties). 
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C. A double-deck structure could be built with a m~n~mum of dis-
ruption to the existing commuter corridor by buying only 
enough land (some 75') to create two three-lane streets on 
either side of the freeway while it was under construction {a 
2-1/2 year process). In this way, Cypress Avenue was split, 
with the north-bound lanes paralleling the east side of the 
freeway and the south-bound lanes on the west side. These 
streets were left in place to improve traffic mobility in the 
affected area, and the contractor could stage his work in the 
75' strip of land between the two streets. 
The double-decked freeway section would be a little over 6,800 feet long 
and was to be California's first. The two 52-foot-wide roadways were to 
be of the concrete box girder type, supported on multiple column rein-
forced concrete bents . Bent spacings were from 70 to 80 feet, with 124 
bents in all. The upper deck would be supported some 50 feet above the 
ground, and many of the upper supporting girders were reinforced with 
post-tensioned rods, an early form of the pre-stress concrete method 
routinely employed in concrete structures today. The finished structure 
would be able to handle 200, 000 vehicles per day, which easily met the 
20-year projections routinely applied to such projects during that time 
period {1951-54). 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF SEISMIC DESIGN CONCEPTS IN CALIFORNIA 
Reinforced concrete and steel structures technology evolved markedly 
during the post-World War II boom years as increasingly larger and larger 
structures were built. By the late 1960's, the entire concept of rein-
forced concrete design changed over from the traditionally-employed work-
ing stress design approach to the current ultimate strength design proce-
dures {American Concrete Institute, 1971). Other significant code changes 
included the employment of continuous spiral reinforcement in load-bearing 
columns which came about around 1968. 
Most of these changes emanated from the consulting structural engineering 
community who were continuing to press the limits in designing larger and 
more complicated structures. 
Earthquake loading was a source of great concern to California's civil en-
gineers whose awareness was piqued during Magnitude 6-1/4 quakes which 
damaged Santa Barbara in 1925 and Long Beach in 1933. Santa Barbara's 
municipal water system had been severely crippled in their quake, and 
Sheffield Dam, a hydraulic fill structure, had been destroyed (Engineering 
News Record, 1925). The 1933 Long Beach event occurred in close proximity 
to a more highly developed area and numerous structural collapses forced 
major changes in the Uniform Building Code and mandated special profes-
sional registration for structural engineers. 
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But, what followed was a paucity of seismic tremors. Seismographs at Cal 
Tech in Pasadena recorded the 1933 Long Beach event (which was epicentered 
offshore on the Newport-Inglewood fault}, with one station recording a 
peak acceleration of 0.13g, or 13% of the force of gravity applied 
laterally. 
In 1940, a Magnitude 7.1 tremor rocked the El Centro area {Johnson and 
Hill, 1982). Strong motion recorders in the area were located inside 
structures located on deep alluvium (in lieu of bedrock}. The May 18, 
1940, El Centro quake was the largest quake of record in the new era of 
seismography which began in the mid-1930's, having a maximum recorded ac-
celeration of 0.33g. The raw El Centro strong motion records were syn-
thesized into structural response spectra which were widely disseminated 
to the engineering profession for use in structural design. This data in-
cluded time histories of simple motion and response to single degree of 
freedom systems, structural response characteristics critical to seismic 
design. The synthesized El Centro data was the first of this kind to be 
employed in California, and it was the strongest motion data (but not 
necessarily the greatest acceleration data) available until the San Fer-
nando Quake in 1971. Subsequent measurements at Parkfield in 1967 (0.50g) 
and San Fernando in 1971 (1.25g) suggested that much higher accelerations 
were possible than previously realized. The designers of the ill-fated 
Cypress Structure utilized a 0.06g horizontal acceleration from the 1940 
El Centro quake in their 1951-54 design. 
The first major structure actually designed to account for earthquake 
loading in the United States was Morris Dam, a concrete gravity structure, 
built on the San Gabriel River in San Gabriel Canyon by the City of 
Pasadena in 1932-35. A fault was discovered in the dam foundation during 
excavation work, so the dam was designed for 6-1/2 feet of tectonic off-
set and a lateral load of O.lOg was applied pseudostatically upon the dam, 
causing its design to be thickened (Morris and Pierce, 1934; Engineering 
News Record, 1938}. Pseudostatic loads were applied to designs to simu-
late lateral earthquake loads, but these assume that such a load is con-
stant when, in fact, it is quite transient. 
In July 1952, California was rocked by a major tremor of Magnitude 7.6 
near Tehachapi on the White Wolf fault zone. Major highway and railroad 
closures over the Tehachapi Pass resulted, but no strong-motion instru-
ments were located close to the shock's epicenter and the quake was com-
pletely unexpected. 
A new awareness of seismic loading and structural response of modern, 
well-engineered structures came about with the 1964 Good Friday quake in 
Anchorage, Alaska. The event measured in at a whopping 8.4 on the Richter 
Scale, the largest quake in America this Century. The destruction was ex-
tensive , with ground shaking 1 as ting some 3 to 4 minutes ( the 1906 San 
Francisco quake shook for 52 seconds and is estimated to have been Mag-
nitude 8. 3) . Large scale ground failures abounded in the Alaska quake, 
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to sea, destroying some 75 homes. The tidal wave created by the Alaska 
Quake damaged California port facilities, particularly at Cresent City. 
Damage assessments by structural and geotechnical engineers sent to 
Anchorage triggered research moneys and programs to explore seismic design 
considerations and building code amendments in the late 196o's. 
THE SAN FERNANDO EARTiiQUAKE OF 1971 
At 6: 15 a.m. on February 9, 1971 , the Los Angeles metropolitan area was 
awakened by a sharp jolt of Magnitude 6.4, centered beneath San Fernando, 
adjacent to a highly-populated area along the northern side of the San 
Fernando Valley near Los Angeles. Two hospitals fell, one dam crumbled, 
and three freeway viaduct sections collapsed; interchanges fell where 
Highway 14 joins the Golden State (I-5), five spans fell where the Golden 
State (I-5) crossed the Southern Pacific Railroad, and the newly-complete, 
but unopened, interchange between the Foothill (I-210) and Golden State 
(I-5) freeways. Twenty other spans experiences hinge connection failures 
of varying degrees. The collapse of a not-yet-opened, state-of-the-art 
structure gained widespread notoriety and caused serious concern amongst 
the Division of Highway's Bridge Departments in Sacramento and Los An-
geles. 
California's first freeway (the Pasadena) had been constructed shortly 
before World War II, but the interconnecting system of highways really 
began to take off in the mid-1950's with the passage of the Interstate 
Highways Act in 1955. The highway building boom crested in the late 
1960' s, and then died a fast death in the early 1970's as the Federal 
Highway Trust Fund moneys were impounded to help balance the Federal 
deficit, and post-Vietnam inflation made new construction three times as 
expensive. In 1975, CALTRANS laid off 15,000 employees and, basically, 
quit building freeways. 
The largest freeway system in the World had been constructed between 1947 
and 1973. It had been designed to accommodate anticipated growth trends 
and the Division of Highways had risen to a position of national, if not 
world, eminence in setting design, safety, and landscaping standards for 
highways. 
But, the first sizable earthquake to test the system was at San Fernando 
in 1971. The collapse of the Highway 14 connector viaducts onto the 
Golden State Freeway (I-5)miraculously only killed two men heading for 
work in a pick-up. Their heirs sued the State, trying, in vain, to prove 
negligence on the behalf of the Division of Highways for designing such 
structures (the courts eventually determined that the State is immune from 
actions alleging design negligence when state-of-the-art engineering 
precepts are used, even if these standards are subsequently superseded.} 
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Shortly after the San Fernando collapse, the Legislature appropriated suf-
ficient moneys to study the various failures and the Federal Government 
followed suit with its own program of research through the National 
Science Foundation, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Corps of Engineers, and 
the U.S. Geological Survey. Cal Tech and U.C. Berkeley headed the list of 
institutions accorded moneys to research the safety of highway viaducts, 
dams, hospitals, and nuclear power plants; this topic being of major con-
cern in the 1970's. 
By 1977, the results of investigations into San Fernando-caused failures 
were complete. In 1973. major amendments to Building Codes were made to 
account for better resisting the observed modes of fail-ure in the San 
Fernando quake. Earth dams, built before 1940, using hydraulic filling 
techniques, were replaced or buttressed by new, mechanically-compacted em-
bankments. Public schools were evaluated, retrofitted (if possible), and 
condemned or sold (for non-school use) if they could not be brought up to 
adequate levels of seismic safety. The Alquist-Priolo Special Studies 
Zone Act was passed by the State Legislature in 1973. This Act required 
local entities to prepare a Seismic Safety Element of their General Plan, 
and required the preparation of special geology reports for proposed con-
struction in known fault zones. Unfortunately, California's active real 
estate lobby axed the additional provisos about any sort of professional 
review of the adequacy of such reports. 
CALTRANS RETROFIT PROGRAM 
Immediately following the San Fernando quake, CALTRANS began retrofitting 
their older bridges. In the following years, CALTRANS received the 
results of the university research and began to implement major procedure 
changes which included the evaluation of each area's Maximum Credible 
Earthquake (MCE) and the corresponding highest levels of ground shaking 
such MCE's would cause on any site. CALTRANS contracted with the State's 
Division of Mines and Geology to prepare a Maximum Credibl-e Bedrock Ac-
cel-eration (Map) from Earthquakes in Cal-ifornia in 1972 (Greensfelder, 
1974). 
Five weeks after the 1971 quake, CALTRANS embarked on a hinge restoration 
program to prevent future pull-out at such connections. Soon, a 3-phase 
retrofit program was put into motion to analyze and amend CALTRANS's pre-
1971 structures. Phase 1 of this program consisted of replacing hinges, 
bearing assemblies. and connectors with seismically-resistant designs. 
Restrainer cables were used to tie girder sections together to prevent 
out-of-phase side sway, excessive opening and "hammering" into each other 
after opening. This program was accomplished on the Cypress Structure in 
1979, and the Phase 1 program was completed by 1987. The Phase 2 retrofit 
program consisted of retrofitting concrete and steel "jackets" on single 
column supports to increase shear capacity and confinement so that com-
pressive failures like those seen at San Fernando would be prevented. 
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Whittier Earthquake, when the I-5/I-605 interchange was damaged. 
Suspended sections would have failed, closing the freeways for weeks if 
not for the Phase 1 restrainers emplaced between 1971 and 1987 at a cost 
of $54 million (Zelinski, 1987). The Phase 2 column support program was 
accelerated to a funding rate of $16 million per year ($65 million total). 
CALTRANS felt they would have lost the I-5/I-605 interchange if it had 
been supported on single columns in lieu of a 5-column bent (Trombatore, 
1987). 
The Phase 3 retrofit program was intended to apply to more complex, 
multi -column structures like the failed Cypress Section of I-880. 
Research contracts for this phase had been initiated with U.C. San Diego 
in 1987. According to Jim Roberts (1989) of CALTRANS, plans for Phase 3 
retrofit were begun in January 1988, but funding levels are currently too 
low for Phase 3 retrofits to go to contract (approved funds are all slated 
for Phase 2 retrofits). No Phase 3 retrofits had been accomplished prior 
to the Loma Prieta Earthquake, but there is CALTRANS's correspondence sug-
gesting that the agency was beginning to take a critical look at such ex-
isting structures in San Francisco as late as August of this year (Gates, 
1989; Klein, 1989). 
A LOOK AT THE CYPRESS STRUCTURE BY U. C. BERKELEY 
From 1976 to 1981, the author was enrolled as a graduate student in civil 
engineering at the University of California at Berkeley. In 1977-78-79, I 
was engaged in a series of individual study projects in structural en-
gineering with the late Professor Emeritus, Jerome M. Raphael, a mass con-
crete and reinforced concrete specialist and former Chairperson of the 
Department's Structural Engineering and Structural Mechanics (SESM) group. 
Raphael had received his Masters degree at MIT in 1935 and had worked on 
the construction and instrumentation of Shasta Dam in the early 1940's 
while with the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. He joined the Berkeley faculty 
in 1953, shortly before receiving the Moissieff Medal from the American 
Society of Civil Engineers for his research in concrete stress distribu-
tion. 
The elevated Cypress structure section of then-State Route 17 was of much 
interest to the late Professor because it was such a massive and rather 
unique structure. The Cypress Structure had not been designed to account 
for creep (or sagging) of the concrete, a favorite topic of research at 
Berkeley, going back into the 1930's. Raphael knew the designers and 
spoke to me of them (Panhorst, Mitchell) and the early connection problems 
associated with m~x~ng post-tensioned pre-stressed girders with 
conventionally-reinforced columns and girders. 
My individual research project for the upcoming quarter (Summer, 1977) 
would be to research the Cypress Structure, with special attention to the 
foundation system and subsurface soils - this being "natural" for me as a 
geotechnical engineering major (I was minoring in structural engineering). 
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I spent a lot of time making phone calls and trips to the structure to 
make measurements and observations of the creep and shear cracking in the 
supporting girders. I also researched what I could from CALTRANS via the 
phone without spending too much time or money tracking down the construc-
tion records. These were things we intended to do if the project were 
funded. 
The purpose of the project was to take a preliminary look at the Cypress 
Structure, then prepare a research proposal for performing an in-depth 
ana'lysis, which other members of the SESM faculty were then embarked. 
Some of the items took a long time to track down or wait on the response. 
We knew from CALTRANS design history that the structure was probably 
designed for a lateral soil acceleration of 0.06 g, typical of that period 
{which I believe came from the 1940 El Centro record). The newly-
published bedrock acceleration map by Greensfelder {1974) showed a prob-
able bedrock acceleration at the site of 0.50g, emanating from a Magnitude 
7.5 quake on the nearby Hayward fault, just 4 miles away. We aLso dis-
covered that the structure had withstood a Magnitude 5.3 shock onLy 13-1/2 
miLes from epicenter whiLe nearing compLetion on March 22, 1957 {see 
C.D.M.G. Special Report 57. 1959). 
This 1957 quake had done noticeable damage to the west San Francisco area, 
and exerted Modified Mercalli scale intensities of at least VII on the 
Cypress Structure. This intensity would likely have corresponded to a 
maximum horizontal acceleration on the order of 0.10g {Murphy and O'Brien, 
1977). Professor Raphael felt that the structure could easily sustain the 
0.10g load without much damage due to the redundancy of old working stress 
design concepts and the increasing strength of the concrete with age (3500 
psi mix originally specified). We did not attempt to run a dynamic 
analysis on the structure, we only prepared a proposal to do so. 
When finished, the proposal included just about everything we had the 
ability to do in those days. The northern portion of the structure {north 
of Eighteenth Street, or at around Bent 66) was founded upon old fill, 
placed on top of an old marine embayment {Radbruch, 1957) . Borings in 
this area revealed soft Quaternary and Holocene-age sediments to a depth 
of around 60 to 70 feet up in the vicinity of Bents 105 to 122. The 
freeway's supporting bents were founded upon concrete piles, but some of 
these pile groups pierced what appeared to be old estuary infillings and 
sinuous sloughs, some of which were filled with sand or gravel. 
That knowledge was enough to make us worry about two potentialities: 
1. Partial liquefaction of the slough sands or fill could remove 
passive support of the nearby piles and pile snaps could occur 
just under the pile cap footing; or 
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2. The presence of deep muds at one end of a long, linear struc-
ture, and stiff sandy materials with more shallow piles at the 
other, could react differently to incoming shock waves; and/or 
could serve to amplify or damp the incoming waves. thereby 
complicating the structure's response. 
Having been originally trained as a geologist, I emphasized to Professor 
Raphael what I had been learning downstairs in geotechnical engineering -
that the presence of loosely-consolidated materials within a stiffer 
"bedrock" depression could generate deadly energy refraction problems. 
But, we also knew that the soft marine clays, or so-called "Bay Muds" , 
near the structure's northern terminus, could also serve to "damp" or 
lessen the incoming earthquake shock wave (which was something of a com-
forting thought). Either way, we ended up concluding that the structure 
was going to respond differently at one end versus the other in an 
earthquake of extended period (something greater than 15 seconds). 
Professor Raphael decided that I should research the costs and pos-
sibilities of performing some on-site dynamic excitation tests to get the 
s true ture' s periods and modes of vibration (which he believed would be 
fairly simple to do), and to perform seismic excitation tests of the foun-
dation, particularly at the north end, atop the estuary deposits. The 
only rig I could find to perform such work was a geophysical testing truck 
called a "Vibroseis", which actually stuck large prongs into the ground 
and input a constant rate and amplitude of shaking. Geophones, inserted 
into or on top of the ground at varying distances away from the Vibroseis 
truck, were to measure seismic refraction arrivals. 
I remember quite vividly Professor Raphael being concerned about the 
tapered columns supporting the Cypress's upper deck. Our proposal had two 
figures which targeted the base of these columns as the "weak link" in the 
supporting load path. Raphael was also concerned about the top connec-
tions in certain cases, but I cannot remember in what context. 
Vertical acceleration was seen to be a potential problem at the column 
bases due to excessive shear, and the general knowledge at that time was 
that 1950 structures were generally underdesigned for shear stresses in-
duced by compression (it had recently been recognized that a substantive 
vertical component of earthquake-induced accelerations had been involved 
in the San Fernando quake collapses) . At the Professor's prodding, I 
searched high and low for some historic records or predictions of what 
vertical accelerations would be in effect in West Oakland. I spent con-
siderable time in this endeavor and had access to many experts, but came 
up with nothing. The frustration of this exercise cannot be too strongly 
stated. It was soon apparent that we had very little strong motion data 
from actual earthquakes in similar geologic settings. Strong motion ac-
celographs can record base input accelerations (horizontal and vertical) 
as well as structural response. We knew from the records at Pacoima Dam 
in 1971 that the location within the structure or above the ground surface 
could mean a 10-fold difference in input motion (such as on a sharp 
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ridgeline) and in response {such as atop a building). I ended up with a 
new appreciation for why engineers use acceleration records of "incorrect" 
magnitudes or irrelevant geologic settings, sueh data are oftentimes the 
only records available! We concluded that we would have to use the San 
Fernando records in our analysis {provided it was funded), even though the 
'71 quake style and type {reverse faulting) would not replicate motions on 
the Hayward or San Andreas (which are strike-slip faults). 
It was our general feeling, at the time, that the Cypress would be most 
vulnerable to three types of ground shaking: 
1. Large horizontal accelerations from a close proximity source, 
running across the structure {from east to west). This would 
be a Magnitude 6.5 to 7.5 event on the nearby Hayward fault. 
Shaking levels of 0.30g to 0.55 g could be expected; or 
2. A lower level, but sustained acceleration of 0.15g to 0.30g, 
emanating from a large event to the south and propagating up 
the length, or axis of the structure. Being very straight and 
a mile long on different foundation materials, this seemed a 
likely scenario for possible vibration phase synchronization, 
or resonance; which is any earthquake engineer's nightmare. 
This phenomenon is shown schematically in Figure 1 {from the 
proposal); 
3. A moderate to long duration event which would input high ver-
ticaL acceLerations (0.05 to 0.20g) which would serve to lift 
the bents up and down, thereby promoting a progressive com-
pression failure of the upper columns. This thinking was in-
fluenced by some of the failure modes seen at San Fernando. 
We were afraid of Rayleigh waves generating such vertical 
loads, but lacked sufficient data to take this idea much fur-
ther. 
The linearity of the Cypress bothered Professor Raphael; his feeling being 
that some unknown portion of seismic energy waves traveling up the axis of 
the structure were sure to be reverberated back, through the structure, 
where they could interact with later, incoming waves. The curvature and 
bifurcation of the double deck at either end could conceivably damp some 
of the return motion, but we felt this was too difficult to model, hence 
the perceived need for some on-site vibration testing. Curved freeway 
viaducts with numerous on/off ramp appendages serve to damp incoming seis-
mic waves, as shown schematically in Figure 2. These types of structures 
are also very hard to analyze for earthquake response behavior, especially 
if they become cracked. 
My study of the Cypress dragged on for months. It was the early fall of 
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The estimated costs were, as I recall: 
Phase 1: 
a. Preliminary dynamic analyses 
b. Site-specific work 
Cone penetrometer testing at north end 
Subsurface sampling, lab testing 
Vibroseis work 
Determination of structural periods 
/modes of vibration 
c. Specific dynamic analysis 
Original plans and maintenance 
records retrieval 
Phase 2: 
Meet with 1 to 3 members of original 
design team or CALTRANS staff 
(as appropriate) 
Preparation of longitudinal and 
bent sections for dynamic analysis; 
set up and run 
FLUSH program runs to obtain 2-D 
soil behavior in earthquake 
set up and run north-south motion 
and two sections with east-west motion 
d. Evaluate above analyses; decide if 
structural modeling required 











(elastic to model static modes of vibration; 
or plastic to model failure modes) 22,000 to 48,000 
e. Devise retrofit measures, as 
deemed appropriate; could include 
physical testing of scaled 
structures in SESM lab 
10,000 to 50,000 
Totals (in 1978 dollars) $49,800 for Phase 1 
$32,000 to $98,000 for Phase 2 
These are the figures we arrived at as nearly as I can recall from my file 
notes. After I turned the project in, I went on to work on another study 
of the heightening of Shasta Dam with Professor Raphael. I recall speak-
ing to him about the status of the Cypress proposal in the fall of 1978, 
whereupon he replied that, "there weren't any research funds allocated for 
that type of structure", or words to that effect. I knew that the Cypress 
had received a Phase 1 retrofit with cable ties and and neoprene cushion 
blocks at the expansion joints in the late '70's and early '80's. 
However, even with all of my trips out to the structure, I hadn't ap-
preciated the pervasiveness of the hinge joints nor that such joints 
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negated moment connections to transmit bending or twist-type loads. I had 
assumed that the main reinforcing steel ran through the columns, much like 
the modern structures I had observed being built in the 1960's and 1970's. 
EXPECTED LEVELS OF SHAKING AT THE CYPRESS STRUCTURE 
By the time Greensfelder' s (1974) baserock acceleration map was released 
in 1974, Bay Area civil engineers had a good idea that expected shaking 
levels were a lot higher than the 0.10g pseudostatic loading we all had 
routinely employed. Greensfelder's map only predicted baserock accelera-
tion levels as high as 0. 50g, over a very large zone within which the 
Cypress structure lay. 
But, a 0. 50g acceleration is very tough to design large heavy concrete 
structures to withstand. The earthquake-induced bending moment on an 
elevated structure is proportional to the structure's overall stiffness, 
mass, and height above the ground to its center of gravity. By supporting 
a heavy box girder 50 feet in the air, the seismic loads are greatly 
heightened. The upper supporting girders weighed something like 165,000 
pounds apiece, and these supported about 80 feet of box girder roadway 
likely weighing around 850, 000 pounds. The widespread use of pre-cast 
concrete reduces the required beam size (and hence, weight), while the ad-
ditional employment of lightweight concrete aggregate halves the mass 
weight. By utilizing modern construction practices, a structure like the 
Cypress would probably weight only 40% to 45% of that structure, with a 
notable lessening of the seismic loads. 
Toward the early 1980's, an abundance of geotechnical engineering and 
planning-level documents were available to predict levels of ground shak-
ing from specific MCE's, which varied from area to area. On the East Bay 
coastal plain, the MCE event was a Magnitude 7.5 event on the Hayward 
fault (C.D.M.G. Special Publication 78, 1987). This fault runs through 
the Berkeley campus, actively creeping and off-setting the Memorial 
Stadium, built in 1912. The Hayward is thought to have spawned Magnitude 
7.0 tremors in 1836 (near Richmond) and 1868 {near Hayward). 
The Hayward fault lies a scant 4 miles from the I-880 Cypress Structure. 
Greensfelder's 1974 baserock acceleration map had been updated by C.D.M.G. 
and CALTRANS in 1987 (Mualchin and Jones, 1987) and now shows the Cypress 
Structure to be just within the 0.50g acceleration. The 1987 C.D.M.G. 
Special Report-78 shows the northern half of the Cypress Structure receiv-
ing a Modified Mercalli Intensity of VIII and the southern half getting IX 
(on the Merritt Sands, See Figure 3) . Using correlations published in 
Murphy and O'Brien (1977), Mercalli Intensities of VIII to IX would corre-
late with accelerations of 0.25g to 0.50g (see Figure 4). 
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Published correlations, by Seed and Idriss (1982) are commonly used to 
back out actual near-surface soil accelerations from predicted bedrock ac-
celeration values. Such estimates can be made by first going to their 
chart relating horizontal distance from fault, quake magnitude, and peak 
horizontal acceleration, reproduced herein as Figure 5 (top). In the case 
of a Magnitude 6. 5 to 7. 5 tremor on the Hayward fault, 4 miles from the 
Cypress Structure, peak accelerations of 0.50 to 0.55g are predicted. 
Actual site response can then be estimated by utilizing another, more ap-
proximate relationship between rock acceleration and surface acceleration 
on particular types of soils, reproduced in Figure 5 (bottom). In the 
case of the Cypress Structure subjected to its MCE on the Hayward fault, 
we could expect maximum accelerations of between 0.27g and 0.39g. depend-
ing on soil type. 
C.D.M.G. Special Publication 78 (1987) went on to warn about the poten-
tialities for ground failure on artificial fill areas, such as the north-
ern half of the Cypress Structure (see Figure 6). The report warns that 
the Cypress Structure would likely be damaged enough to prevent the pas-
sage of traffic "for several days" in the event of a major quake. 
ACTUAL LEVELS OF SHAKING EXPERIENCED DURING TilE LOMA PRIETA EARTHQUAKE 
The Loma Prieta Earthquake occurred at 5:04 p.m. on Tuesday, October 17, 
1989, just as the third game of a San Francisco Bay World Series was get-
ting underway at Candlestick Park. Initial reports pegged the quake at 
Richter magnitude of 7. 0. This was downgraded to a 6. 9 several days 
later, then recast at an official magnitude of 7.1 some 10 days later, 
based on energy release data recorded by far-away stations. Strong motion 
(source) shaking was recorded for approximately 15 seconds, although site 
response shaking was estimated to be as much as 30 to 40 seconds in some 
areas. 
The quake came as no surprise to those familiar with California seis-
micity. In 1984, the Division of Mines and Geology (Real, 1984; p. 2-3) 
had predicted "odds better than 1 in 2 (>50% probability) that a major 
earthquake would occur on the San Andreas Fault between San Jose and San 
Juan Bautista (see Real, p 28). The quake was forecast to be a magnitude 
6.5 to 7+ event (Real, 1984, p 3). The next most likely quakes had odds 
of only 1 in 10 (10%) and 1 in 20 (5%), suggesting that the Loma Prieta 
event was 5 times more likely than any other major event in the Bay 
Region. 
The Loma Prieta Quake will likely be the most well-instrumented quake in 
the United States' history. The U.S. Geological Survey expected the quake 
sometime soon, so an elaborate network of recording stations (over 400) 
was within 200 km of the epicenter. The style of slippage was unusual 
however for the San Andreas. The quake's focal depth was quite deep, 10-
12 miles, instead of the usual 6 to 8 miles. The Pacific Plate (Santa 
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Cruz side) rose 1.7 meters (5.6 feet) on an inclination of 70 degrees from 
horizontal, suggesting mostly dip-slip movement in lieu of the San 
Andreas' more usual strike-slip motion (with the western plate heading 
north). The rupture energy petered out about 4 km below ground surface. 
The theoretical surface rupture would be 5.25 feet vertical and 1.92 feet 
horizontal if the offset had propagated all of the way to the ground sur-
face. Geologists have found no such break, only a ridgetop zone of about 
9 left-stepping en-echelon breaks across the tope of Santa Cruz Mountains, 
just east of the summit of State Route 17. The largest of the ground 
scarps is about 2.3 feet high and exhibits left-lateral motion, suggesting 
clockwise rotation and possible ridge spreading. Geologists are now pos-
tulating that the fault rupture is disseminated over a broad zone, 1/2 to 
1 mile wide with significant "ridge spreading" serving to obscure any 
"clean" style of surface rupture. 
One of the other benefits to come out of the 1971 San Fernando quake was 
the creation of the C.D.M.G. 's Office of Strong Motion Studies which 
manages the California Strong Motion Instrumentation Program (CSMIP). At 
the current time, several hundred strong-motion records are generated for 
any sizable earthquake. In this manner, localized ground amplification 
effects can better be appreciated and MCE' s and planning-level documents 
annotated to reflect areas of increased concern. It is only by having an 
adequate number of records that site-specific seismic analyses can be gen-
erated and tested for validity (the acid test of any analytical procedure 
is to see if it will accurately predict previously-recorded or observed 
behavior). 
The Cypress Structure was located almost exactly 100 km (62 miles) from 
the quake's epicenter. A preliminary evaluation of the available CSMIP 
data suggests a marked component of so-called ground enhancement effects, 
seen in the recorded acceleration arrivals. Simply put, Oakland got ham-
mered much worse (.18 to .29g) than any other area close in range to the 
quake (and on the north side of the fault). San Francisco averaged 0.10g 
over 8 reporting stations, with the Presidio skewing even that average 
with a 0.21g reading. These strong-motion data (for horizontal accelera-
tions only) are presented graphically in Figure 7. 
Ground amplification effects are very apparent in some adjacent stations. 
For instance, the recorder on Yerba Buena Island on colluvial sands, but 
adjacent to Cretaceous-age bedrock, measured only 0.06g, while the station 
on Treasure Island, a man-made appendage to Yerba Buena, registered 0.16g, 
or more than 2-1/2 times the acceleration! In nearby Oakland, vertical 
accelerations of between 0.04 and 0.16g were measured, also suggestive of 
ground amplification. In the downtown Oakland area, a cover of young 
(Pleistocene and Holocene-age} alluvial and marine sediments is over 400 
feet thick in places, lying upon the much older Franciscan Assemblage 
bedrock (Jurassic-Cretaceous-age). The actual topographic profile of this 
marked bedrock interface and the consistency and dynamic properties of 
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those soft geologic fills overlying it needs to be probed more deeply in 
the next round of earthquake engineering research (hopefully in the 
1990's). 
FAILURE OF THE CYPRESS STRUCTIJRE SECTION OF I-880 
What follows is a brief description of the observed modes of failure of 
the elevated Cypress Structure. These observations were all made within 
48 hours of the structure's collapse. The explanations offered are neces-
sarily preliminary in nature, and could, therefore, later be modified or 
discarded, depending on what the various investigative teams discover 
during razing of the structure. 
Eye-Witness Accounts 
Eye-witness accounts will be of much value in sorting out the sequence of 
failure. Preliminary accounts, several of which are by civil engineers 
who were driving on the structure's upper deck, are summarized below: 
1. The structure was unusually empty at the time of failure (5:04 p.m. 
2. 
PST). Traffic speeds on the upper, southbound deck were unlimited 
(up to 70 mph). Traffic on the lower deck was similarly unencum-
bered, but somewhat slower (reported at 65 mph, but likely closer to 
55 mph). 
The earthquake shock waves rolled through the structure's lon-
gitudinal axis, from south to north. Like giant ocean waves, the 
structure lifted and dropped. Driving became difficult and some 
people slowed, some stopped, and some sped up to get off of the 
structure. 
3. Drivers and passengers of vehicles on the upper deck describe seeing 
intermittent "puffs" of concrete dust at the supporting bents, in-
dicting explosive crushing, spalling and flexure at those locations. 
It is not yet known exactly at what point the puffs of dust occurred 
with respect to the seismic wave crests or troughs. Eye 
witnesses/survivors of the lower deck have not been interviewed and 
their observations could be of critical importance. 
4. The structure survived shaking long enough that one car of civil en-
gineers from the Alameda County Public Works Department (Danehy, 
personal communication) first noticed the quake while somewhere in 
the Oakland distribution structure, drove onto the Cypress, saw and 
experienced the ground roll "waves" reverberating up through the 
structure, the concrete "puffs", and sped up, surviving the trip. 
They describe a progressive failure of the upper deck, starting at 
its north end, about the time they reached the south end (presumably 
across Bent 62, near Eighteenth Street). If this description is ac-
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curate, a distance of approximately 1.05 miles was traversed at 55 
to 70 mph, beginning at the onset of shaking. At an average speed 
of 62 mph, this trip would take 61 seconds (to reach the relative 
safety of the southern half of the structure). This preliminary ac-
count would suggest that the failure was progressive and may have 
initiated from north to south after the relative cessation of strong 
motion ground shaking. Certainly, more accounts need to be analyzed 
with respect to timing. 
Failure Mode with Hinge Joints at Bottom of Columns 
As mentioned at the outset, the Cypress Viaduct's designers had inserted 
structural hinges or joints at the top or bottom {or both) of the upper 
supporting columns. The hinges were placed at the bottom of the columns 
on the conventionally reinforced bents, shown in Figure 8. The 20 No. 18 
(2-1/4 inches diameter) reinforcing bars within the upper columns were 
stopped just above the hinge joints. A shear key approximately 18" x 26" 
with 4 No. 11 dowels and a 4"-diameter copper drain pipe comprised the 
connection. The dowels appear to have extended 24" into either side of 
the joint. Expansion joint building felt provided the bond break for the 
hinge. These were applied as two 9" -wide strips parallel to the 
structure's axis and two 5"-wide strips on the opposing sides {north and 
south). 
Just below the hinge, a critical reinforcing detail (shown on Figure 8) 
was utilized which provided discontinuous reinforcing steel in the lower 
column area above negative moment reinforcing steel coming up the lower 
column and turning into the lower supporting girder. 
U .C. Berkeley Professors Jack Moehle and Stephen Mahin have identified 
this area as the zone of a critical crack" which sheared off in the 
failure sequence (see Moehle, 1989). We can infer that the region of the 
"critical crack" was an area of potentially high shear stress, noted by 
the structure's designers because they called for No. 4 ties at 12" spac-
ings in this area and in the lower half of the upper column, just above 
the hinge joint. 
In Figure 9, a diagram illustrating a possible mode of failure at the 
lower hinges is shown. As the structure bent lifts and falls with each 
earthquake load cycle (combined with the structure's own modes of vibra-
tional response), a high compressive load is concentrated at the joint be-
cause there is insufficient tensile reinforcement across the joint to hold 
the column together in "negative gravity". Side-swaying motion could in-
duce the same separation (as shown in Figures 14 and 15) . On a down or 
compressive cycle, the outside wedge of discontinuous reinforcement is 
spalled off in excessive shear. This outside block {just below the hinge 
joint) was consistently found beneath the failed columns as a block ap-
proximately 12" thick and about 36 .. square. Four No. 18 bars, only 48" 
long, were consistently noted to be attached to such blocks. The bars had 
been cut prior to placement. 
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Of the 51 bents that were damaged or failed, 28 of them were of the design 
shown in Figure 8. All 28 of these bents failed with the upper deck fall-
ing onto the lower deck, as depicted in Figure 10. The upper column toes 
failed in shear and kicked outward, with the "critical crack" normally 
emanating from the inside of the hinge joint downward, on an approximately 
60 degree inclination. 
In collapsing outward, the columns caught and dragged the outer two rows 
of No. 18 rebars reinforcing the lower columns. The upper sections of the 
failed columns were pushed inward, ripping their upper moment connections 
in compression and exposing the steel and connection details with the up-
per supporting girders. 
Hinge Joints At Top of Columns 
As mentioned previously, the Cypress Structure was designed during the 
early days of pre-stressed concrete technology. In instances where 
slightly greater spans were needed for skewed railroad/street crossings or 
accommodation ramps, the designers had opted to utilize post-tensioned 
rods to pre-stress the upper supporting girder and in certain instances 
simply added a third base column for the lower supporting girder. In this 
manner, the upper girder could be maintained at a constant size, but span 
greater lengths or be extended for anticipated expansions. This size con-
straint was important to maintaining adequate clearance for the lower 
traffic deck. 
One complication of this system was that it mixed different types of rein-
forced concrete members. In Figure 11, a conceptual view of the post-
tension pre-stress is shown. If the upper columns were structurally at-
tached to the upper supporting girder, the expected 1" to 3" of pre-
stressed compression could deflect the supporting columns inward, breaking 
or overstressing them. The structure was being constructed from the 
ground up. As a consequence of this dilemma, the designers deleted con-
tinuous reinforcement through the supporting connections and installed 
hinge joints. 
Hinge Joints at Top and Bottom of One Column and Top or Bottom of Opposing 
Column 
In most instances where pre-stressed girders were used, a third hinge was 
added at the bottom of either of the upper columns within the supporting 
bent. These "doubly-hinged" columns appear to have been emplaced with an 
eye toward a planned expansion of the structure, shown diagramatically at 
Bents 72 (Figure 12) and 76 (Figure 13). Hinges at the top and bottom of 
the western columns would have more easily facilitated their removal 
during the planned expansion. The post-tension rods within these bents 
were threaded and capped with an eye toward splicing onto them later (see· 
Figure 13). 
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In retrospect, a three-hinge supporting system possesses several 
deleterious traits during sustained seismic loading. As shown in Figure 
14, upon lateral loading by an earthquake, the structure will sway to the 
side of the advancing wavefront. The amount of sway and the loads induced 
by such ground motion are a function of the structure's stiffness, mass, 
and height above ground. In the Cypress Structure, the heavy upper deck 
was placed some 50 feet off the ground, raising the structure's center of 
gravity to a level nearly coincident with the lower hinge(s). As the bent 
deflects in response to primary ground motion (Figure 14), translation or 
bending is more easily accommodated at the hinges, therein concentrating 
deflection-induced stress at the area of the adjacent column without such 
a hinge (as no bending moments are transmitted across the hinges). Large 
bending-induced stresses will occur at this juncture which is the only un-
hinged point on the upper deck load path (Buckle, 1989; Mahin, 1989). 
Localized crushing of the concrete on opposing sides of the hinges could 
also occur at excessive deflections, giving rise to the concrete dust 
"puffs" noted by eye witnesses. After this primary sideways deflection, 
the structure would deflect back in an opposing direction, provided it 
maintained some degree of elasticity. 
The structure could be expected to become more plastic and more sluggish 
in its response with increasing cracking. The corresponding reaction 
cycle of an undamaged bent is depicted in Figure 15. Localized crushing 
could occur on the opposing sides of the hinge joints on the reaction 
cycle and the sense of loading would be reversed on the unhinged section 
of column (the lower right portion of the upper supporting column, 
depicted in Figures 14 and 15). 
Observed failure modes of the three-hinged bents were more complicated 
than others described previously. In the vicinity of Bents 71-74 (Grand 
Avenue), the viaduct made a 15 degree turn to the north, following the 
original trend of Cypress Avenue. The traffic decks were super-elevated, 
with the easterly side up-going through the turn (as shown in Figure 13). 
In Figure 16, the failure mode in this turn is depicted schematically (but 
the super-elevation is not shown). The easterly column on the "high side" 
failed in shear with the top, hinged end of the column, impacting on the 
street. The failed column pulled off significant reinforcing steel from 
the lower base column, suggesting a shearing or tearing motion downward, 
before the column head toppled over. Some of the post-tensioned rods 
snapped in the partial collapse of the upper deck. The west side of these 
partially-collapsed bents simply leaned over at the upper and lower hinges 
with some minor compressive spalling of the inside top of the column. 
This spalling likely occurred during collapse of the upper supporting gir-
der and may not have been induced by side-sway during the earthquake. The 
surviving hinged columns in this area are relatively undamaged, which sug-
gests that breakage was focused on the area of large bending-induced 
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Another heretofore unseen failure mode occurred in the of Bents 
to , towards the southernmost end of the failure. In this area, the 
failure appears to have been rapid and catastrophic. As in 
the columns on the west side of the bents were 
blown clear of the structure, consistently landing on their upper ends. 
These columns were found to be virtually intact with the 4 No. 11 dowels 
and copper drain pipe cleanly sheared off at either end. In some in-
stances , however, the dowels are gone and the dowel holes in the column 
are suggesting complete and rapid 
The supporting column on the opposing (east) side exhibits 
the consistent mode of failure described previously. The column base has 
sheared off and taken off about 20" of the lower outside portion of the 
base column. This shearing proceeded for 7 to 8 feet downward, then the 
upper end of the column toppled over, impacting the street below. 
A universal observation at the failure site was the apparent survival of 
the base bents (shown in 18). The failure se-
at Bent , the second bent south of 
is the first in a series of 16 three-column base bents 
south which withstood the quake (the Phase 1 restrainer cables 
the upper box girder deck). Within the failed sequence 
112), four 3-column base bents (nos. 95-98) were used on 
over a Santa Fe spur in the center of 
Bents 95 and 98 lost their upper decks, but 96 and 
a delicate sanctuary to those motorists luck enough to be 
Much can be learned from studying bents and 97. They were at 
the of the upper columns (to carry a post-tensioned girder, but had a 
thicker section at the column bases of the skew) and were 
reinforced No. 18 bars). Bents 
carried the maximum while 95 and 
the transition at skews of The skew 
increased shear area to the base of the upper 
columns which were cracked, but not failed. The less severe 
skew on bents and 98 were failed in shear at the base of the upper 
columns in the manner described in sections. 
factor which remains to be explored is the increased stiffness of 
bents. By their very design, the side sway and center of 
somewhat lowered; even though most had upper and lower 
and through 98 did have lower hinge ). This 
increased cross-sectional stiffness of the supporting bents needs to be 
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total col-
This occurred between 
Thirty-second Street over-
was noticeably tilted toward 
foundation failure or it could 
outward in the collapse the two decks, in which case 
pile cap. In this section viaduct was super-elevated 
upper column bases were both This is in the area where an 
old channel parallels the west of the viaduct 
) . Confined channel deposits of saturated materials could 
have lurched or partially liquefied. evidence of liquefaction or 
failure was noted, but such evidence may lie underneath this 
anomalous failure area, and this should be examined. During demolition of 
the , sonic velocity tests could be on the pile cap at bents 
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materials. 
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of a so-called "ground 
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increased levels of 
- 3 
survivors interviewed is 




be in the 
different foundation 
Structure if the 
to be learned 
complex struc-
seismically-
was the paucity of 
records and site 
structural failure were 
State's first double-decked 
' Phase 3 retrofit program 





as the Phase 2 program received 
Had the Loma Prieta quake struck 
DR. DA ID ROGERS 
Whittier 
later CALTRANS' 
retrofits have saved the structure. 
is 
built 
that all of the modern structures 
survived the with little or no damage. 
a magnitude 7.0 , but well-engineered 
structures possess enough redundancy to survive. There's nothing in-
wrong with double-deck freeways so as then are to 
) standards with proper considerations. 
not designed for close to the loads that were im-
DR. J. DAVID ROGERS 
REFERENCES CITED 
American Concrete Institute, 1971, Code Requirements for Rein-
ACI Committee 318, Detroit, 78p. Concrete (ACI 318-71): 
Booker, 1954, Bay Area Freeways: Multi-million Dollar Construction 
Under Way: in California and Public Works, Vol. 33. 
, March-April: State of California, Dept of Public Works, pp. 
Buckle, Ian G., 1989, Outline of Testimony Given to the Senate Transporta-
tion Committee, State of California: Oakland, 1 November 1989, 13p. 
Dr. Buckle is the Deputy Director of the National Center for 
Engineering Research at State University of New York at 
Buffalo. 
California Division of Mines, 1959, Sa."l Francisco Earthquakes of March 
Report 57: ed. by G.B. Oakeshott, 127 p. 
California Division of Mines and , 1987, Earthquake Planning 
Scenario for a Magnitude 7.5 on the Hayward Fault in the 
San Francisco Bay Area: Special Publication 78, 100 p. 
Division of Mines and , Second Quick Report on 
CSMIP Strong-Motion Records from the October 17, 1989 Earthquake in 
the Santa Cruz Mountains: Office of Strong Motion Studies, 
Sacramento, 5 p. 
California, State of, 1957, "A First: Initial Double-deck Freeway In Oak-
land Is Opened" in California and Public Works, Vol. 35, n. 
: Dept. of Public Works, pp. 43-44. 
Edward, 1989 personal communication. Mr. Danehy is the Alameda 
Engineering Geologist and is attached to the County Public 
News Record, 1925, 
Santa Barbara; Vol. 95. n. 
Municipal Utilities at 
' pp. 146-148. 
News Record, 1938, Dam Tested 
' pp. 184-185. 
Artificial Earthquake, August 
Gates, James, 1989, Phase 2 Retrofit 
Memorandum from Division of Structures 
File .0, August 21, 1989, 2 p. 
- San Francisco: CALTRANS 
Special Projects Branch, 
1974, Maximum Credible Bedrock Accelerations for 
in California: California Division of Mines and Geology 
, 1989, personal communication. 
- 3 
• 
DR. J. DAVID ROGERS 
References (Cont.) Page 2 
Johnson, .E. and Hill, D.E., of the Imperial Valley: in 
The Imperial Valley Earthquake of October 15, 1979: U.S.G.S. 
Professional Paper 1254, pp. 
Klein, Gene Jr., 1989, Letter to A.S. Bash, Project Director of Mission 
Bay Development Project with Ci and County of San Francisco 
regarding seismic evaluation of Interstate 280: CALTRANS, Division 
of Structures, Special Projects Branch, Sacramento, File 821, 2 pgs. 
Mahin, Stephen, 1989, Verbal testimony before the State of California 
Senate Transportation Commit tee, Oakland, 1 November 1989. Dr. 
Mahin is the Chairman of the Structural Engineering and Structural 
Mechanics Division, Dept. of Civil Engineering, at U.C. Berkeley. 
Moehle, Jack P., 1989, Preliminary Observations on the Performance of Con-
crete Freeway Structures: prepared statement for press conference at 
U.C. Berkeley on October 26, 1989, 2 pages. Dr. Moehle is Associate 
Professor of Civil Engineering at U.C. Berkeley. 
Morris, S.B. and Pierce, C.E., 1934, A Concrete Gravity Dam for a Faulted 
Mountainous Area: Engineering News Record, December 27, 1934, pp. 
823-827. 
Mualchin, L. and Jones, A.L., 1987, Peak Accelerations for Maximum 
Credible Earthquakes in California California Division of Mines 
and Geology, Map Sheet 45. 
Murphy, J.R., and O'Brien, L.J., 1977 the Correlation of Peak Ground Ac-
celeration Amplitude with Seismic Intensity and Other Physical 
Parameters: Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America, Vol. 
, n. 3. pp. 877-915. 
Radbruch, Dorothy H., 1957. Areal and Geology of the Oakland 
West Quadrangle, California: U.S. Geological Survey Misc. Geologic 
Invest. Map I-239 . 
Real, Charles R., 1984, A Review of Probabilistic Long-term Forecasts for 
Major Earthquakes in the San Francisco Bay Region: A Report to the 
Area Earthquake Study, California Seismic Safety Commission: 
California Division of Mines and , July, 38 p. 
Roberts, James, 1989, Oral Testimony before the State of California Senate 
Transporatation Committee, Oakland, 1 November 1989. Mr. Roberts is 
the Chief of Structures for CALTRANS. 
Seed, H.B., and Idriss, I.M., 1982, Ground Motions and Soil Liquefaction 
During Earthquakes, Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, 
Berkeley, 134 p. 
-13 -
DR. J. DAVID ROGERS 
References (Cont.} Page 3 
Trombatore, Leo. J., 1987, Issue Memo to Governor George Deukmejian on 
(Phase 2) Highway Earthquake Program: through J .K. Geoghegan, Oct. 
22, 1987, 2 pages. Mr. Trombatore was the State Director of 
Transportation at the time. 
Zelinski, R.J., 1987, CALTRANS Memorandum on Seismic Retrofit of Bridges-
Phase 1, Division of Structures, Office of Structure Design, 
Sacramento: File 859, 1 page (attachment 1 to Trombatore memo}. 
-135-
DR . J 
• DAVID 
• 



























D MERCAlll INTENSITIES 
I 
,D,M.G. Special Report 78 (1987) 




























«upper ~~•~wn~-~~----~- ~~~~w 











( 110 Ita) 
VIII IX X 
MODIFIED MEACAlLI INTENSITY 
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June 1977 
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21 OF THE 124 SUPPORTING BENTS WERE 
Of THIS DESIGN. THE UPPER PORTION Of 
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FAILURE MODE IN VICINITY OF BENTS 71 - 74 
@ COLUMNS WITH UPPER AND LOWER HINGE JOINTS BLOWN OUT INTACT 
@ POST - TENSIONED RODS SNAPPED AND POPPED OUT OF BROKEN CROSS 
GIRDERS 
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3-COLUMN BASE 
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